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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1992, China joined 154 other countries at the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro by signing the primary international agreement on climate change, the
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).' About six
years later, in May 1998, China signed the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. 2 At the
time, China was a moderate emitter of carbon dioxide (C0 2), the main greenhouse
gas covered by the Kyoto Protocol?
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was ratified by China in August 20024 and
entered into force on February 16, 2005.' The United States has ratified the
UNFCCC6 but not the Kyoto Protocol. China's twenty years of market reform
resulted in an impressive decline in carbon intensity, which is measured by CO 2
As its rapid
emissions per dollar of gross domestic product (GDP) created
industrialization unfolds, China is emerging as a major contributor to global
warming.8 The International Energy Agency has noted that primary energy demand
between 2000 and 2005 grew by 55 percent while GDP increased by 57 percent
This increase in energy demand was driven by "surging electricity demand (met
largely by increased coal use) and by the manufacture of metals, building materials
and chemicals for infrastructure, consumer goods and export markets."10 As a
consequence, emission of CO 2 grew on average by 10.6 percent between 2000 and
2005, which was three times the 3.2 percent growth rate of the 1990s." A June 2008
report by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency suggests that China
overtook the United States as the highest emitter of CO2 in 2006.12 For many
environmentalists in the United States and Europe, a major problem with the Kyoto

1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed by P.R.C. June 11, 1992, S.
TREATY DOc. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; see also Daniel
Bodansky, Prologueto the Climate Change Convention, in NEGOTIATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE RIO CONVENTION 45, 45-74 (Irving M. Mintzer & J.A. Leonard eds., 1994) (describing the
events leading up to 1992 UNFCCC convention).
2. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed by
P.R.C. May 29, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, 37 I.L.M. 32 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. In September 2002,
Premier Zhu Rongji announced China's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol at the U.N. World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg the month before. Shao Zongwei, Nation Approves Kyoto
Protocol, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 4, 2002, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/200209/04/content_134822.htm.
3. NETH. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, GLOBAL C02 EMISSIONS: INCREASE CONTINUED IN 2007
http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/2008/GlobalCO2emissionsthrough2007.html;
(2008),
available at
Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Increases Lead as Biggest Carbon Dioxide Emitter, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2008,
at A5.
4. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2; see also Shao, supra note 2.
5. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 25(1), 25(3).
6. UNFCCC, supra note 1.
7. Ying Fan, Lan-Cui Liu, Gang Wu, Hsien-Tang Tsai & Yi-Ming Wei, Changes in Carbon Intensity in
China: Empirical Findings from 1980-2003, 62 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 683, 683 (2007). An earlier
study by a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology concluded that the decrease in
energy intensity in the 1980s was the result of changes in China's production technology. For conclusions
from the MIT report, see XIANNUAN LIN, CHINA'S ENERGY STRATEGY: ECONOMIC STRUCTURE,
TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES, AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION (1996).
8. See NETH. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, supra note 3 (noting that China topped the list of carbon
dioxide emitting countries for the first time in 2006).
9. INT'L. ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007: CHINA AND INDIA INSIGHTS 263
(2007).
10. Id.
11. Ross Garnaut, Frank Jotzo & Stephen Howes, China's Rapid Emissions Growth and Global
Climate Change Policy, in CHINA'S DILEMMA 170, 172 (Ligang Song & Wing Thye Woo eds., 2008).
12. NETH. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, supra note 3.
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Protocol was that neither the United States nor China was subject to the CO2 cap
that it set for developed countries.'3
Since taking office in 2009, the new Obama administration has changed the
dynamics on climate change both in the United States and in the international arena.
Shortly after his inauguration, President Obama instructed the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to reconsider California's request for a waiver of Clean
Air Act preemption so that the state could enact air pollution standards for motor
vehicles that were stricter than the national standards. 4 The EPA under the Obama
administration seems to be moving in the direction of regulating CO2. 5 These moves
are welcomed by the international community.'6 In Washington, D.C., there seems
to be a growing sense of urgency among President Obama's policy advisors to work
with China on climate change. In early February 2009, U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton visited China with climate change at the top of her agenda. 7 From
February to June 2009, an impressive list of high officials and political leaders took
turns visiting China to discuss climate issues, including U.S. Special Envoy for
Climate Change Todd Stern, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, Secretary of
Commerce Gary Locke, Senator John Kerry, and Speaker of the House Nancy
Pelosi. 8 The prioritization of climate change during these visits to China by highlevel U.S. government officials suggests that climate change, compared with other

13. RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY:
BEYOND KYOTO 8 (2003). According to Stewart and Wiener, since the Kyoto Protocol leaves China, other
developing countries, and the United States out of the regulatory framework, "the Kyoto Protocol now
omits more than half of global greenhouse gas emissions, and that omission will worsen over time because
it excludes the countries whose emissions are growing fastest." Id. at 8.
14. Letter from Mary D. Nichols, Chairman, Air Resources Board, to Lisa P. Jackson, AdministratorDesignate, United States Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectld=090000648082aa54&disposition=attach
ment&contentType=pdf. State of California Request for Waiver Under 42 U.S.C. 7543(b), the Clean Air
Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4905 (Jan. 28, 2009); see Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act
Preemption for California's Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009)
(noting the EPA's reconsideration and eventual grant of California's request for waiver).
15. Lisa P. Jackson, the new E.P.A. Administrator, announced on February 17, 2009 that the agency
would reconsider a Bush administration decision not to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from new coalburning power plants. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Expected to Regulate Carbon Dioxide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2009, at Al.; Juliet Eilperin, Winds of Change Evident in U.S. Environmental Policy, WASH. POST, Mar. 30,
2009, at A3.
16. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) welcomed President Obama's action on
global warming. See Obama Administration Starts Defining Climate Policy, U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME,
Jan.
27,
2009,
http://www.unep.orgIDocuments.MultilinguaVIDefault.asp?DocumentlD=556&ArticlelD=6051&l=
en&t=long (describing President Obama's initial climate-change policy efforts). U.N. Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon even appealed to President Obama to attend a hastily planned summit in late March to
promote international efforts on climate change. Colum Lynch, U.N. Chief Wants Obama at ClimateChange Summit, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2009, at A12.
17. Glenn Kessler, U.S., China to Focus on Slump, Climate: Long-Standing Human Rights Concerns
Put on Back Burner During Clinton Trip, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2009, at A14; Mark Landler, Clinton
Paints China Policy with a Green Hue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at Al.
18. Ariana Eunjung Cha, At Odds on Emissions, U.S., China Open Talks, WASH. POST, Jun. 9, 2009,
at A06; Wang Linyan, U.S. Senator Upbeat after "Productive" Green Talks, CHINA DAILY, May 29, 2009, at
2; Shai Oster, China Emissions Cleanup Is Urged, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009; Michael Wines, In Beijing,
Pelosi Callsfor Cooperationon Climate, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A12.
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issues like human rights, is high on the Obama administration's agenda in relations
with China.19
Despite the growing pressures on China regarding climate issues, Premier Wen
Jiabao indicated that China is not ready to accept a carbon cap at the United
Nation's Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, to be held in December 2009,
stating that "it's difficult for China to take quantified emission reduction quotas at
the Copenhagen conference, because this country is still at an early stage of
development. 2 0 In July 2009 at the Group of Eight (G8) meeting in L'Aquila, Italy,
the United States and European Union, again, failed to convince China or India to
commit to a carbon cap.2 1
It is in this context that environmentalists in the West are increasingly intrigued
by the normative question: how to make China "Green"? 22 There is no doubt that
China's position is a crucial factor for the Copenhagen conference. Missing in this
discussion, however, is an equally important question: what is the best means to
achieve Green? Here, we face two distinct but closely related notions: Green as an
ecological goal and Green as a political or policy process. In the United States and
Europe today, Green as an ecological goal is often believed to be closely associated
with Green as a political process in which environmental groups serve as the agents
of democracy. 23 Green as an ecological goal cannot be achieved without regularly
revitalized democratic deliberation in politics. These analytically distinct aspects of
Green politics are often mixed together, and the connection between the two is
taken for granted. As Thomas Heller pointed out, "[t]he fundamental climate
analysis remains wholly normative, while the positive politics
or organizational
24
behaviors that forestall the desired actions are marginalized.
In this article, I will use China's climate change policy to show that this
distinction has its value in climate discourse. Part II describes China's policy shift
towards climate change since December 2004-the new developmental strategy. So
far, this new strategy is hardly noticed in the West despite the widespread concerns
about China's policy on climate change. Then, in Part III, I will analyze the policy
tool implementing this new developmental strategy-the law enforcement

19. Kessler, supra note 17, at A14.
20. Interview by Lionel Barber, Editor of the Financial Times, with Wen Jiabao, Premier of the
P.R.C. (transcript available in FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/795d2bca-fOfe-lldd8790-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=l); see also Emma Duncan, Wonderful, Wonderful Copenhagen?
Don't Count on a Climate-changeDeal, ECONOMIST, Nov. 19, 2008, at 103.
21. Patrick Wintour & Larry Elliott, G8 Summit: Barack Obama Says World Can Close the Carbon
Emissions Gap, GUARDIAN, July 9, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/
jul/09/barack-obama-g8-climate-change.
22. Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1805
(2008); Jeffrey Logan, Joanna Lewis & Michael B. Cummings, For China, the Shift to Climate-Friendly
Energy Depends on International Collaboration, BOSTON REV. (Jan./Feb. 2007), available at
http://bostonreview.net/BR32.1/loglewcummings.php.
23. See JOHN S. DRYZEK, ET AL., GREEN STATES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: ENVIRONMENTALISM
IN THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY, AND NORWAY 20-21 (2003) (comparing the

degree of the integration of environmental interest groups into the political processes of the United States.,
United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway); see infra text accompanying notes 211-213.
24. Thomas Heller, Climate Change: Designing an Effective Response, in GLOBAL WARMING:
LOOKING BEYOND KYOTO 115, 124 (Ernesto Zeditlo ed., 2008). Similarly, when discussing environmental
law in the context of environmental federalism debates in the United States, Professor Daniel C. Esty
pointed out, "[slimply put, how we regulate is more important than where we regulate." Daniel C. Esty,
Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (1999).
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campaigns. The article aims to show a great discrepancy between the new
developmental strategy, which clearly recognizes Green as the goal, and the law
enforcement campaigns, which are largely a consolidation of the Party/State's power,
leaving Green as a democratic process questionable.
If there is a "Green
Revolution" going on in China, this article argues, it is a Green forced from above.

II.

CLIMATE CHANGE IN CHINA'S NEW DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGY

China negotiated the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol based on a wide range
of considerations, both domestic and international.25 Thus, China also has a
significant interest in keeping its status as a member of a similar global framework in
the near future. Part II of this article illustrates how climate change is understood
inside the Chinese policy-making process. Section A starts by discussing China as a
beneficiary of the Kyoto Protocol. Section B proceeds to illustrate the decisive
change of direction in China's developmental strategy announced at a December
2004 meeting of the Communist Party. Finally, Section C shows how the new
developmental strategy is subsequently formulated into a climate change policy.
A.

China'sInterests in the Kyoto Protocol and Beyond

A key benefit that China enjoys under the Kyoto Protocol is the market
operation called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 6 Article 12 of the
Kyoto Protocol permits Annex I countries (developed countries) to invest in
emission control facilities in non-Annex I countries. 7 Emission reduction, once
certified by a special procedure, will be counted as a contribution toward compliance
with the investing country's overall commitments under Article 3.28 China's
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was partially motivated by the promises of
financial assistance and technology transfer under schemes such as CDM.29 As a

25.

Elizabeth Economy, Chinese Policy-making and Global Climate Change: Two Front Diplomacy

and the InternationalCommunity, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 19,
19-41 (Miranda A. Schreurs & Elizabeth Economy eds., 1997) [hereinafter Elizabeth Economy, Two Front
Diplomacy]; Michael T. Hatch, Chinese Politics, Energy Policy, and the International Climate Change
Negotiations, in GLOBAL WARMING AND EAST ASIA: THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 43, 43-65 (Paul G. Harris ed., 2003); see generally Lester Ross, China: Environmental
Protection,Domestic Policy Trends, Patternsof Participationin Regimes and Compliance with International
Norms, 156 CHINA Q. 809 (1998).
26. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Website), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/mechanisms/cleandevelopment-mechanism/items/2718.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
27. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12.
28. Id. Emission trading brings benefits to the parties in the transaction and global society. Richard
Stewart and Jonathan Wiener estimated that emission trading limited to the industrialized Annex B
countries would reduce total costs of the Kyoto Protocol compliance by over 50% relative to a regime with
no international trading at all; but full global trading including all the developing countries would reduce
total costs by over 75% relative to a regime with no trading at all. STEWART & WIENER, supra note 13, at
40.
29. Early in the 2000s, Zhihong Zhang, then Chief Technical Advisor for a Global Environment
Facility (GEF) Energy Efficiency Project in China under the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization, observed that, "[s]pecific to the climate change regime, China's involvement has been
motivated by the availability of funding from such sources as the [GEF] and the prospect of technology
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signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, China was eligible for the CDM schemes. Initially,
China was slow in jumping into the CDM market. When the United States decided
to back out of the Kyoto Protocol in early 2001,30 China realized that the CDM
market was much smaller than it had expected. So it took action quickly to attract
CDM projects.3' Late in 2001, a joint study on CDM was launched by a partnership
between China, Germany, Switzerland, and the World Bank and was published in
July 2004.32 The study projected that China had the potential to take around fifty
percent of the global CDM market and sent an encouraging signal to the
policymakers in China.33
In response, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the
designated authority to approve CDM projects, quickly released rules and
streamlined approval processes for CDM projects in 2004. 34 In February 2005, the
Renewable Energy Act was passed by the Chinese legislature.35 Starting with the
fourth quarter of 2005, CDM projects in China began to pick up, and China quickly
became a major beneficiary of worldwide CDM schemes.36 In 2006, China captured
$3.2 billion in subsidies out of the $4.8 billion that were available for dozens of
37
projects, accounting for two-thirds of carbon-credit trading under CDM.
transfer and provision of financial assistance promised by the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol." Zhihong
Zhang, The Forces Behind China's Climate Change Policy: Interests, Sovereignty, and Prestige, in GLOBAL
WARMING AND EAST ASIA: THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 66,73
(Paul G. Harris ed., 2003); see Global Environment Facility (GEF), http://www.gefweb.org/
interior.aspx?id=23052 (last visited Oct. 3, 2009) (stating that Zhihong Zhang served as Chief Technical
Advisor for the GEF prior to joining the GEF Secretariat in 2004).
30. On March 28, 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would not
implement the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. Julian Borger, Bush Kills Global Warming Treaty,
GUARDIAN, Mar. 29, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2001/mar/29/globalwarming.usnews;
Douglas Jehl, U.S. Going Empty-Handed to Meeting on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at
A22.
31. Zhongxiang Zhang, Toward an Effective Implementation of Clean Development Mechanism
Projects in China, 34 ENERGY POL'Y 3691, 3699 (2006).
32. WORLD BANK, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM IN CHINA: TAKING A PROACTIVE AND
SUSTAINABLE APPROACH (2d ed. 2004).
33. Id. at 114.
34. See China Passes Renewable Energy Law, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, Mar. 9, 2005,
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2005/03/china-passes-renewable-energy-law-23531
(providing examples of how NDRC passed specific renewable energy targets and regulated the purchase
and use of solar photovoltaics (PV), solar water heating, and renewable energy fuels, as well as stating that
the law includes specific penalties for non-compliance).
35. Ke zai sheng neng yuan fa [Renewable Energy Act] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l.
People's Cong., Feb. 28, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) 2005 STANDING COMM. NAT'L. PEOPLE'S CONG.
GAZ. 33 (P.R.C.).
36. See U.N. ENV'T PROGRAM [UNEP], UNEP 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2008), available at
http://www.unep.org[PDF/AnnualReport/2007/AnnualReport2007 en-web.pdf
("Lack
of equitable
regional distribution is currently a major drawback of the CDM. A few countries have captured the largest
share of the global CDM project portfolio while sub-Saharan Africa has been largely bypassed by the
CDM market. Of the total 2,647 projects currently in the global pipeline, only 33 projects are in subSaharan Africa, with 21 of these in South Africa."); U.N. Env't Program [UNEP] Riseo Centre on Energy,
Climate,
and
Sustainable
Development
[URC],
CDM
Projects
by
Host
Region,
http://www.cdmpipetine.org/cdm-projects-region.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2009) (showing CDM projects
hosted in four countries (Mexico, Brazil, China, and India) from the first quarter of 2004 to the fourth
quarter of 2008).
37. Keith Bradsher, Clean Power That Reaps a Whirlwind, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/091business/O9carbon.html?pagewanted=l&_r=l;
Keith
Bradsher,
Knowing Which Way Wind Blows: Handful of Nations Get Most Subsidies, IN'T'L HERALD TRIB., May 10,
2007.
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UNFCCC's statistics (as of September 11, 2009) suggest that, in terms of average
annual certified emission reductions (CERs), China's CER is 184,759,660 tons
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2e), accounting for 58.99 percent of the world's total
CDM projects. 18
Most CDM projects in China are concentrated in the renewable energy sectors,
especially hydro and wind power. 9 By March 2008, NDRC had approved 854 CDM
projects in the renewable energy sector, accounting for 71.35 percent of all projects.0"
In addition to the financial benefit, a recent study suggests that Brazil, China, India,
and Mexico, the major beneficiaries of CDM projects, also benefit from technology
transfer as a consequence of those projects. 4 According to this study, technology
transfer occurs in the following types of projects: wind power, hydrofluorocarbons
(HFC) decomposition, methane destruction, landfill gas recovery, and nitrous oxide
(N,0) destruction.
These researchers noted that China's economic growth rate
enables technology transfers, which in turn, is correlated with technological
capabilities.4' Thus, the State Council has made clear that it wants the CDM to
continue in the post-Kyoto era. Its 2008 policy statement indicated that, "China
holds that CDM, as a comparatively effective and successful cooperation mechanism,
should continue to be implemented after 2012.""
As a consequence of climate change concerns, China also has growing interests
in broader trade and economic issues. In the past, China embraced globalization by
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), making it the preferred destination of
Western polluting industries. "5 Increasingly, climate change is providing trade and
investment opportunities. For example, in the solar energy sector, China is the
largest manufacturer and market for solar water heaters, accounting for sixty percent
of the world's total production. a China is also a leading manufacturer of solar

38. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Website), Expected Average Annual
CERs from Registered Projects by Host Party, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/
AmountOfReductRegisteredProjPieChart.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
39. China Passes Renewable Energy Law, supra note 34.
40. Gao Hairan, Wo guo qing jie
fa zhan ji zhi xiang mu shi shi xian zhuang he zheng ce jian yi [CDM
Implementation in China and Related Policy Suggestions], 30 NENG YUAN YU HUAN JING [ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENT] 33,34 (2008) (P.R.C.).

41. Antoine Dechezlepretre, Matthieu Glachant & Yann Meniere, Technology Transfer by CDM
Projects: A Comparison of Brazil, China,India and Mexico, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 703, 703-04 (2009).
42. Id. at 706-07.
43. Id. at 709-10.
44. Bai pi shu you guan yu zhong guo ying dui qi hou bian hua de zheng ce yu shi shi [White Paper on
China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change] pt. VII (issued by Info. Off. State Council,
Oct. 29, 2008) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node27055612.htm;
see also Li Jing, Nation Issues Post-Kyoto Plans, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 30, 2008, at 2, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2008-10/30/content_7156323.htm ("The clean development mechanism
(CDM) should continue to be implemented even after 2012, when the Kyoto Protocol expires ....).
45. In 2007, Handan Iron and Steel Corporation, a steel conglomerate headquartered in Handan City,
Hebei Province in northern China, decided to buy the hulking blast furnace from ThyssenKrupp's former
steel mill in the Ruhr Valley of Germany. The furnace was dismantled and shipped piece by piece from
Germany's old industrial heartland to Hebei Province, China's new Ruhr Valley. Joseph Kahn & Mark
Landler, China Grabs West's Smoke-Spewing Factories, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/21/world/asia/21transfer.html.
46. THE CLIMATE GROUP, CHINA'S CLEAN REVOLUTION II: OPPORTUNITIES FOR A Low CARBON
FUTURE 5 (2009) [hereinafter CHINA'S CLEAN REVOLUTION II].

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 45:201

photovoltaic cells, second only to Japan. 7 In fact, China's solar growth has largely
been fueled by growing international demand from countries like Germany, Spain,
and Japan, rather than by domestic policies.4'
B.

China's New Developmental Strategy

China's decision to open to CDM projects under the Kyoto Protocol in mid2004 was not incidental. Hu Jintao took office in September 2004, marking China's
"Hu-Wen era."4 9 One of the differences between the Hu-Wen Administration and
the Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji Administration (1993-2003) was the basic strategy
for economic growth, which guides environmental policy. °
China declared a strategic change of policy in late 2004 at the Central
Economic Work Conference.5' The Conference noted that there were some
"unhealthy and unstable factors" in the previous year, though the Party managed
them well. 2 It acknowledged that the relationship between challenges stemming
from the quickly-growing economy, such as increasing conflicts between urban and
rural areas, the protection of resources and the environment, and responses to
economic and social growth, in turn restricts "economic development and social
harmony."53 In more theoretical terms, this is a question of development: "With
more population and less per capita natural resources China is situated in the new
development stage of industrialization, urbanization, marketization and
internationalization. 5 4 Thus, a new organizing principle, the "scientific viewpoint of
development," served as the main point of departure for the new administration.
The new principle required five balances:
[T]he "five balances"-balancing urban and rural development, balancing
regional development, balancing the economic and social development,
balancing the harmonious development of human and nature, and
balancing domestic development and opening up to the outside world;
accelerate the building of a conservation-minded society in an effort to
solve the contradictions of energy resources; get hold of favorable
opportunities to push on reforms; protect and achieve the interests of the
masses by adhering to putting people first.55

47. Id.
48. Id. at 28. It is reported that Suntech Power Holdings, China's biggest solar panel manufacturer, is
preparing to build plants to assemble their products in the United States in order to bypass protectionist
legislation. Keith Bradsher, China Racing Ahead of U.S. in the Drive to Go Solar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
2009, at Al.
49. John Wong & Lai Hongyi, The Hu-Wen New Deal, in CHINA INTO THE HU-WEN ERA: POLICY
INITIATIVES AND CHALLENGES 3, 9 (John Wong & Lai Hongyi eds., 2006).
50. Maria Heimer, The Cadre Responsibility System and the Changing Needs of the Party, in THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN REFORM 122, 122 (Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard & Yongnian Zheng eds., 2009).
51. China Sets Energy, Resources Saving As One Of Key Economic Targets, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Dec. 6,
2004, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200412/06/eng20041206_166239.html.
52. Put into Effect Scientific Viewpoint of Development in an All-round Way, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE, Dec. 15, 2004, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200412/14/eng20O4l2l4167332.html.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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These five balances were meant to point to a scientific approach to development,
which means a different mode of economic growth. In the past, economic growth
was based on high-volume consumption of energy and raw materials, causing heavy
pollution, low output, and low efficiency. This new growth mode would be based on
conservation, science, and technology. For that purpose, there was a need for
structural change in the economy. An editorial in the People's Daily, published on
the same day, commented that the development strategy meant that China must
"overcome the tendency of one-sidedly pursuing quantity and speed, and genuinely
shift the focus of economic work to improving the quality and efficiency of economic
growth. 5 6 In December 2005, the State Council issued a formal regulation on
economic restructuring.57 In 2004, concerns about environment or climate change
became linked with three other strategic issues that provided the political context for
a new developmental strategy.
First, food security and energy security were major issues. With the world's
biggest population, food security has always been a concern in China's long history.
However, this issue gained a heightened awareness in China after the publication of
Lester R. Brown's article, Who Will Feed China? Wake-up Call for a Small Planet,
which was later expanded into a book-length report and circulated widely
throughout China. 8 Brown's work alarmed policymakers in the top leadership
positions and prompted meteorologists in China to pay attention to climate change
in response to concerns of food security. 9 "Prolonged periods of drought resulting
from China's ...consecutive 'warm winters' will pose a serious threat to the
country's crop yields," China Meteorological Administration (CMA) said in a 2008
report.60
Another security issue in the 2000s has been energy security. China became a
net importer of petroleum products in 1993 and is now the world's second-largest
consumer of oil behind the United States. 6' Given its experience in the 1950s (a de
facto embargo from the West) 62 and the early 1960s (withdrawal of Soviet aid),63

56. Editorial, Command Whole Situation of Eco-social Development with Scientific Development
Concept,
PEOPLE'S
DAILY,
Dec.
6,
2004,
at
1,
available
at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200412/06/eng20041206_166301.html.
57. Cu Jin Chan Ye Jie Gou Tiao Zheng Zan Xing Gui Ding [Decision of the State Council on
Promulgating the "Interim Provisions on Promoting Industrial Structure Adjustment" for Implementation]
(promulgated by St. Council, Dec. 2, 2005, effective Dec. 2, 2005) ST. COUNCIL (P.R.C.).
58.

LESTER R. BROWN, WHO WILL FEED CHINA:

WAKE-UP CALL FOR A SMALL PLANET (1995).

Brown's articles appeared in Chinese journals in 1995, for example, Shui Lai Yang Huo Zhong Guo? [Who
Will Feed China?],4 ZHONGGUO NONGCUN JINGJI [CHINESE RURAL ECONOMY] 42 (1995).
59. See Pan Yunzhao, Zhuan fang Lai Site Bu Lang: Wo cong mei you yao mo hua Zhongguo,
[Interview with Lester R. Brown: I Have Not Demonized China], INT. HERALD TRIB. (P.R.C.), Apr. 22,
2005, available at http://news.sohu.com/20050422/n225297275.shtml.
60. Li Jing, Warm Winter "Major Threat" to Crops, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 26, 2008, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-11/26/content_7239388.htm.
61.

INFO. OFF. OF THE STATE COUNCIL (P.R.C.), CHINA'S ENERGY CONDITIONS AND POLICIES

(2007), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/236955.htm. For a more detailed analysis
of energy production and consumption in China, see TATSU KAMBARA & CHRISTOPHER HOWE, CHINA
AND THE GLOBAL ENERGY CRISIS: DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR CHINA's OIL AND NATURAL
GAS (2007).

62.

See generally SHU

GUANG ZHANG, ECONOMIC COLD WAR:

AMERICA'S EMBARGO AGAINST

CHINA AND THE SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1949-1963 (2001) (describing the history and consequences

surrounding the U.S. trade embargo against China during the 1950s).
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China has long standing concerns about dependence on foreign oil. Internal debate

on energy security intensified during the early 2000s.' A study of the internal
debate on energy security during the early 2000s suggests that "Chinese analysts
consider oil price volatility and physical supply disruptions to be the main threats to

energy security." 65 "They are especially concerned about the negative impact of oil
price fluctuations on China's economy and social stability." 66 Power outages in 2004
were also assessed through the lens of political stability and security. Energy policy

formation in China during the 1970s and 1980s was characterized by the
fragmentation of authority, according to Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michel
Oksenberg. 7 In the last two decades, however, growing dependence on the

international market has brought the political and strategic considerations back into
the policymaking process, which helps reinforce control by the Party and the State
Council.' One consequence of such change is the potential for the environmental
community to influence the top policy makers.
Second, during the 2000s there was widespread discontent as a consequence of
the market reform that brought China further into the global market.69 Some of
China's influential policy advisors, such as Justin Yifu Lin, Hu Angang, and Wang

Shaoguang, recognized China's uneven income and wealth distribution problem and
recommended policies to balance distribution.70 In an article published in the
influential journal, The Chinese Economy, in 2003, Wang and Hu warned, "[i]n our

opinion, the problems that beset China's current social conditions as a whole are
extremely severe, and China is on the brink of once again entering a period of social
63. Zhong Su guan xi da shi ji (1949-1991) [Sino-Soviet Relations Events (1949-1991)],
http://news.163.com/09/0811/20/5GFBBKOB00013KCL.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2009) (P.R.C.).
64. Erica S. Downs, The Chinese Energy Security Debate, 177 CHINA Q. 21, 34 (2004). Internal
debates on energy security started as soon as China became a net oil importer in 1993. Id. at 21.
65. Id. at 31.
66. Id. (citing Lin Yu and Chen Xiaobin, Nengyuan zhuanjia tan Zhongguo yingdui shiyou anquan de
jinmouyuanlue [Energy experts discuss short and long-range strategiesfor China's oil security], ZHONGGUO
KUANGYE BAO [CHINA MINING NEWS], June 10, 2003, CI; Jiu guoji youjia baozhang yiji guojia shiyou
anquan wenti fang Zhongguo shichang jingji yanjiusuo suozhang Chen Huai boshi [Interview with Dr.
Chen Huai, Deputy Director of the Market Economy Research Institute about the sharp increase in
international oil prices and national oil security], ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHIBAO [CHINA ECONOMIC TIMES],
Sept. 20, 2000, CI) (P.R.C.).
67. KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND CHINESE
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 17-19 (1987); KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY
MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES 3 (1988). Themes developed in these books
were applied to other areas and to the 1980s reform in China. See BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND
DECISION MAKING IN POST MAO CHINA 1 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992)
(discussing fragmentation of authority in the context of 1980s reforms).
68. Philip Andrews-Speed, who worked in the Chinese energy sector during the 1990's, describes the
changes in China since the 1980s. See, e.g., PHILIP ANDREWS-SPEED, ENERGY POLICY AND REGULATION
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 51-53 (2004) (discussing "unifying forces" such as the Communist
Party and the growing need for consensus among governmental departments).
69. Dali Yang, Economic Transformation and Its Political Discontents in China:
Authoritarianism,Unequal Growth, and the Dilemmas of PoliticalDevelopment, 9 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI.
143, 152-53 (2006). Broad social resistance became more visible during this period of time. See, e.g.,
KEVIN J. O'BRIEN & LIANJIANG LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE IN RURAL CHINA (2006); POPULAR PROTEST
IN CHINA 12 (Kevin J.O'Brien ed., 2008).
70. Justin Yifu Lin, Rebalancing Equity and Efficiency for Sustained Growth, in CHINA'S DILEMMA:
ECONOMIC GROWTH, THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 90-93 (Ligang Song & Wing Thye
Woo eds. 2008); Angang Hu, How Will China Build a Well-off Society for All of Its Citizens?. 30 CHINA
BUS. REV. 50, 50-55 (2003); Shaoguang Wang, Angang Hu & Yuanzhu Ding, The Social Instability Behind
the Economic Prosperity,36 CHINESE ECON. 5, 5-10 (2003).
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instability."71 They actively engaged in advocacy of a new mode of development,
which was in favor of building up China's basic social welfare, more consumptiondriven economic growth, and better protection of the environment. 2 Environmental
issues and sustainable development were components of this new developmental
strategy. This vision was shared by policy advisors who were even closer to the
power center in Beijing. The best example would be that of Yu Keping, Deputy
Director of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau under the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), an influential theoretician
within the establishment, who addressed the question of sustainable development in
China. 3
Third, since the 1990s there were growing efforts to redefine China's position or
identity in global politics. The notion of China's emergence as a responsible big
country and its stated ambition to develop its "comprehensive national power" were
key sources of national strength. 4 In connection with these notions, there was
increasing unease within China concerning its image as a producer of low-tech
products flooding the world markets and China's identification as "the world's
workshop."" There was a call for a transition from "made in China" to "designed in
China. 7 16 There were ambitious plans for the high-tech sectors: the high-speed train,
a regional jet program, and 3-G wireless standards, among others.7 In these policy
discussions, NDRC became an advocate for investing in energy and Green
technology. This is a crucial factor because NDRC, since 2003, has become the main

71.
72.

Shaogang Wang, et al., supra note 70, at 6.
See, e.g., Nicholas R. Lardy, China: Toward a Consumption-DrivenGrowth Plan, POL'Y BRIEFS
IN INT'L ECON., Oct. 2006, at 1, 4.
73. Yu KEPING, DEMOCRACY IS A GOOD THING: ESSAYS ON POLITICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2009). Two of the essays in this collection addressed the environment: Chapter
9 ("China's Economic Modernization and Sustainability") and Chapter 10 ("Harmony between Man and
Nature: China's Environmental Practice and Challenges").
74. Yongnian Zheng, Comprehensive NationalPower: An Expression of China's New Nationalism, in
CHINA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY 191, 192-93 (John Wong & Gungwu Wang eds., 1998).
75. China Bids to Shake Off Image of "World's Workshop", DAILY STAR, Feb. 19, 2006, availableat
http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/02/19/d60219051154.htm.
76. See Innovate or Wait to Perish, CHINA DAILY, July 11, 2008, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2008-07/lllcontent_6836816.htm (suggesting that China is losing its
competitive edge in production, and it needs to expand into innovation as well); Alice Rawsthorn, China's
New Designers: Building On A Rich Heritage Of Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/07/arts/07ihtDESIGN10.html?_r=1&scp=l&sq=china%27s%20new%20designers&st=cse (discussing the transition to
"Designed In China").
77. For plans for high-speed trains, see Shirong Chen, China Unveils High-Speed Railways, BBC
NEWS, Sept. 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8246600.stm. For plans for the regional jet program, see
Xin
Dingding,
Homegrown Regional Jet Unveiled, CHINA
DAILY,
Dec. 22,
2007,
http:lwww.chinadaily.com.cnchina/2007-12122/content_6340750.htm. For plans for the 3-G standard, see
David Barboza, China Plans to License 3 Wireless Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2009, at B9, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/technology/Olwireless.htmlscp=1&sq=china%2Oplans%20to%201icen
se%20wireless%20standard&st=cse; 3G Is Here, Finally, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 8, 2009, at 1, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2009-01/08/content_7377968.htm. Technical standards have become
a focal issue in China's recent policy making. E.g., RICHARD P. SUTTMEIER, XIANGKUI YAO & ALEX
ZIXIANG TAN, STANDARDS OF POWER? TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S NATIONAL STANDARDS STRATEGY 1 (2006).
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regulatory agency on climate change. Thus, China's official perception on climate

change in 2004 had a quiet but decisive shift: from environment to energy policy.'8
C.

Climate Change Policy Formulated

Principles of the Central Economic Work Conference were further elaborated
in October 2005 at the Party's fifth plenary session of the Sixteenth Central
Committee. A plenum is the highest forum within the Party for deliberation and
cultivating consensus before a major policy shift is declared to the whole body of the
Party. This major policy shift toward social development was embodied in two new
slogans:
"building a harmonious society" and the "scientific approach to
development. "

The meeting adopted a detailed proposal as a foundation for the

"11th Five-Year Plan" (2006-2010).

The general goal set by the proposal for 2010

was to double the GDP from its 2000 level.8' In order to achieve this goal, China

must improve energy efficiency and reduce energy consumption; for this purpose,
China would reduce energy consumption by twenty percent in 2010 from its 2005
level and bring ecological deterioration under control." In March 2006, the Party
submitted the proposal to the legislature, the National People's Congress, which
'
approved it as the "11th Five-Year Plan."83
The Plan also added a target of reducing

major pollutants by ten percent from their 2005 levels by the end of 2010." It further
included a general goal that by 2010, "progress be made in greenhouse gas

emissions."'8' The ten percent target was not new as it was also in the earlier 10th
Five-Year Plan (2001-2005).' What was new, however, was that the 11th Five-Year
Plan explicitly indicated that these targets were binding (yue shu xing).
Once the new developmental strategy was formulated by the Party and put into
the Five-Year Plan, the cabinet-the State Council headed by Premier Wen
Jiabao-was tasked with its implementation. Following the Party's meeting in

78. See Dongsheng Zang, From Environment to Energy: China's Re-conceptualization of Climate
Change, 27 WIS. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2009).
79. POL. BUREAU CENT. COMM., ZHONGGUO GONG CHAN DANG SHI LIU IE WU ZHONG QUAN HUI
GONG BAO [COMMUNIQUE OF THE FIFTH PLENARY SESSION OF THE 16TH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA] (2005) (P.R.C.), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2005-

10/11/content_3606215.htm.
80. New
Five-Year Plan to
See
Revolutionary Changes, XINHUA,
available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/11/content_3606172.htm.
81. C. Cindy Fan, China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010): From "Getting Rich First" to
"Common Prosperity",47 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 708, 710 (2006).
82. Id. at 710-11.
83. Guo min jing ji he she hui fa zhan de shi yi ge wu nian gui hua gang yao [The Eleventh Five-Year
Plan for the Development of National Economy and Society] (promulgated by the Tenth Nat'l. People's
Cong. Fourth Session, Mar. 14, 2006) (P.R.C.), http://www.cctv.com/news/china/20060316/102285.shtml
[hereinafter, The 11th Five-Year Plan] (providing detailed provisions of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan);
Fan, supra note 81,710-11.
84. Guan yu "Shi Yi Wu" qi jian quan guo zhu yao wu ran wu pai fang zong liang kong zhi ji hua de pi
fu [Approval of the Major Pollutants Emission Control Plan During the "Eleventh Five-Year" Period]
(issued by the St. Council, Aug. 5, 2006, effective Aug. 5, 2006) 2006 ST. COUNCIL 70 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_394866.htm; Fan, supra note 81, at 711.
85. The 11' Five-Year Plan, supra note 83, ch. 3.
86. Guo min jing ji he she hui fa zhan de di shi ge wu nian ji hua (2001-2005) [The Tenth Five-Year
Plan for the Development of National Economy and Society (2001-2005)] (promulgated by the Ninth
National People's Cong. Fourth Session, Mar. 15, 2001) (P.R.C.).
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October 2005, the State Council issued a circular in December entitled "Decision to
Carry Out Scientific Approach to Development in Environmental Protection. 8 7 It
took up the "scientific approach to development" and "harmonious society" as new
guidelines, pushing for structural reform in the economy and shifting the economic
growth model. In the meantime, relevant departments and agencies under the State
Council began working on the indicators of the targets set in the 11th Five-Year
Plan.
These departments included the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC), the State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA),
and the State Statistic Bureau. In August 2006, two indicators were chosen to
measure the "major pollutants": sulfur dioxide (SO 2) and chemical oxygen demand
(COD).' The goal of a ten percent reduction was interpreted to mean a reduction of
sulfur dioxide from 25.49 to 22.94 million tons and a reduction of COD from 14.14 to
12.73 million tons. 9 Having decided the total target reductions, the State Council
allocated quotas to each of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities
directly under the Central Government.
In the State Council the most powerful agency is NDRC, which plays a key role
in China's domestic and international climate policy. Within its broad jurisdictions,
NDRC is in charge of central economic planning, macro-economic policy, and
policies regarding the nation's energy and natural resources. In June 2007, NDRC
issued China's first policy statement on climate, the "National Climate Change
Program." 9 As the first official statement, it covered a broad range of issues:
endeavors China had taken, the challenges it was still facing, its policy principles and
objectives, measures and policies it was prepared to apply, and its basic positions on
climate change in the international arena. Despite its breadth, the Program largely
defined China's climate policy through the lens of energy-energy efficiency,
conservation, technology, and renewables. It reiterated the target of reducing
energy consumption per unit of output value in GDP by twenty percent and set a
new target of raising the proportion of renewable energy to ten percent of the
primary energy supply by 2010.91 The biggest institutional innovation in the Program
was that the National Leading Group to Address Climate Change was formed, and
its office was to be set within NDRC. 92 The Leading Group is a high-level policy
87. Guan yu luo shi Kexue Fazhan Guan jia qiang huan jing bao hu de jue ding [Decision to Carry out
Scientific Approach to Development in Environmental Protection] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec.
3, 2005, effective Dec. 3, 2005) (P.R.C.), http://202.123.110.3/zwgk/2005-12/13/content_125680.htm.
88. Sulfur dioxide, found in its highest concentration around industrial facilities, is commonly used as
an indicator of air quality due to its negative health and environmental effects. Guan yu "Shi Yi Wu" qi
jian quan guo zhu yao wu ran wu pai fang zong liang kong zhi ji hua de pi fu [Approval of the Major
Pollutants Emission Control Plan During the "Eleventh Five-Year" period] (issued by the St. Council,
Aug. 5, 2006, effective Aug. 5, 2006) 2006 ST. COUNCIL 70 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/ content/2006/content_394866.htm; see, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency,
Report
on
the
Environment,
Sulfur
Dioxide
Emissions,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/eroe/index.cfm?fuseaction=detail.view
Ind&ch=46&subtop=341&lv=list.listByChapter&r=188208 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009). Chemical Oxygen
Demand (COD) measures the amount of organic matter in water samples and is used to determine the
quality of local water sources. See, e.g., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
http:l/www.fao.orglgtos/tems/variable-show.jsp?VARIABLEID=123 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
89. The 11 Five-Year Plan, supra note 83.
90. NAT'L. DEV. AND REFORM COMM'N. [NDRC], CHINA'S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
PROGRAM (2007), availableat http://www.china.org.cn/engtish/environment/213624.htm.
91. Id. pt. 3, § 3.
9Z Id. pt. 4, § 5.
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deliberation and decision-making body chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao and
composed mostly of ministers from different departments. 9 The choice of NDRC as
the Leadership Group's office location suggested NDRC's lead role in shaping
climate policy, which in part explains why the National Climate Change Program
was so centered on energy.

III. CLIMATE CHANGE AND REGULATORY CHOICE
This part discusses the subsequent choice of regulatory policy in implementing
the new developmental strategy decided at the December 2004 Central Economic
Work Conference. At the core of the regulatory policy is the closure campaign.
However, law enforcement campaigns are not new to the 2000s. In fact, one of the
first environmental measures in post-Mao China was the obligatory tree planting
campaign. 94 Are there any alternatives to a closure campaign? Were alternative
policy instruments considered and discussed? Section A discusses the political limits
on the options in choosing the regulatory tool; it then proceeds, in Section B, to
explain the rationales of the key policy-makers for why a closure campaign is
attractive. Section C explains how closure campaigns were launched and how they
worked in 2007. Section D further explains the internal mechanism of closure
campaigns. Finally, Section E looks at the top-down nature of the closure
campaigns.
A.

Policy Instruments: PoliticalLimits on Options

In climate change literature, the two most commonly discussed policy tools to
control carbon dioxide are the so-called "cap and trade" and the carbon tax. "Capand-trade" is adopted in the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES
Act)-which passed in the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009, and has yet
to be voted upon in the Senate 95-- and the European Union Emission Trading
System, which entered into force in 2003.96 In China, pilot projects on emission
trading of sulfur dioxide, COD, and carbon dioxide had started in the late 1990s.9'
Environmental exchanges were set up in Beijing and Shanghai in August 2008.
However, as China is unwilling to impose a carbon cap on itself, only voluntary
trading occurs. Although voluntary trading does happen,9" the power of the market
93. Id.
94. Lester Ross, Obligatory Tree Planting: The Role of Campaigns in Policy Implementation in PostMao China, in POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN POST-MAO CHINA 225, 225-52 (David M. Lampton ed.,
1987).
95. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press111/20090515/hr2454.pdf; see also, Steven Mufson, David A.
Fahrenthold & Paul Kane, In Close Vote, House Passes Climate Bill, WASH. POST, June 27, 2009, at Al;
John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2009, at Al.
96. 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within
the community).
97. Richard D. Morgenstern, et al., Emissions Trading to Improve Air Quality in an Industrial City in
the People's Republic of China, in CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT 150, 150-79 (Kristen A. Day ed., 2005) (discussing the pilot project at Taiyuan, capital city
of Shanxi province, central China).
98. In August 2009, an automobile insurer from Shanghai purchased carbon credits for an amount of
Rmb 277,699 ($40,627) on the Beijing Environment Exchange. Kathrin Hille, Chinese Group Buys
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force is limited. Since it is not an Annex I country under the Kyoto Protocol, China
is not obliged to set a target level for carbon dioxide. It takes full advantage of this
status. Despite their ambitious tones and strictly domestic contexts, all the policy
statements discussed above deliberately avoided setting specific CO2 targets. The
National Climate Change Program, for example, was largely silent on carbon
dioxide, except for the claim that measures taken would reduce CO 2 emission.'
For many others, the carbon tax is considered the most effective option for
curbing consumption of fossil fuels.' ° Professor Richard N. Cooper suggested in
2004 that China may consider a carbon tax. '°1 In 2005, the State Council's
Development Research Center, joined by NDRC's Energy Institute and the Ministry
of Finance's Fiscal Policy Institute, led a carbon tax study.' °2 Pan Yue, the Deputy
Minister of SEPA, wrote an article for a national newspaper in 2007, suggesting a
"green taxation" regimen be introduced in China.' 3 Early in 2009, the Ministry of
Finance initiated some studies on the taxation scheme together with the Ministry of
Environment Protection (MEP)."° But the issue became a political one when the
United States contemplated imposing a carbon tax on imports in its climate change

Voluntary Carbon Credits, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6eel1240-82a0-llde-ab4a00144feabdcO.html; Carbon Markets in China: Verdant?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 2009, at 66.
99. CHINA'S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAM, supra note 90, pt. 3, § 3.
100. Richard N. Cooper, Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at
66, 74 ("For problems such as reducing emissions, the favorite instrument of economists is to tax the
offending activity."); see, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, A Missed Opportunity on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2009, at BU04 (critiquing the cap-and-trade design in President Obama's climate change bill);
William D. Nordhaus, After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming, AM. ECON. REV.,
May 2006, at 31 (advocating tax- or price-based regimes); Richard N. Cooper, The Case for Charges on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Harvard Project on Int'l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper No. 08-10,
2008), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CooperWeb4.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2009) (advocating a
worldwide tax on greenhouse gas emissions); William D. Nordhaus, Sterling Professor of Econ., Yale
Univ., Economic Issues in Designing a Global Agreement on Global Warming, Keynote Address at the
Climate Change: Global Risks, Challenges, and Decisions Conference at Copenhagen (Mar. 10-12, 2009),
available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/documents/Copenhagen-052909.pdf (arguing for a harmonized
global carbon tax). Dr. James Hansen, NASA scientist, has been a longtime advocate of carbon tax. See
Carbon Tax & 100% Dividend vs. Tax & Trade: Hearing on Scientific Objectives for Climate Change
Legislation Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of James E. Hansen,
Goddard Inst. for Space Studies, NASA), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?
formmode=view&id=7847 (arguing the economic benefit to a tax on carbon emissions).
101. See Richard N. Cooper, A Carbon Tax in China? (August 2004) (unpublished paper, available
online at http://environment.harvard.edu/docs/faculty-pubs/cooper-Carbon.pdf) (evaluating whether China
is likely to implement a carbon tax, and discussing the economic impact of such a tax).
102. This study was continued in 2006 and became part of a bigger research project led by the
Development Research Center, "A Study on Design and Implementation of Energy Tax in China."
ZHONGGUO KE CHI XU NENG YUAN-SHI SHI SHI YI WU 20% JIE NENG MU BIAO DE TU JING YU CUO SHI
YAN JIU [A STUDY OF APPROACHES AND METHODS TO MEET CHINA'S 20% ENERGY EFFICIENCY
TARGET FOR 2010] 271, 271-352 (2008) (P.R.C.).
103. Pan Yue, Economic Policies Can ControlPolluters, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 19, 2007, at 10, available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-09/19/content_6117513.htm.
104. One recent such study was led by the Fiscal Policy Institute under the Ministry of Finance, joined
by the Ministry of Environment Protection and State Administration of Taxation. See Dui Zhongguo shi
shi tan shui yu neng yuan zheng ce fa gui de tao lun [Discussions on Policies and Regulations of Imposing
Carbon Tax and Energy Tax in China], ZHONGGUO NENG YUAN JIN RONG WANG [WORLD ENERGY
FINANCE NETWORK], Apr. 26, 2009 (P.R.C.), http://www.wefweb.com/news/2009426/0853244434_0.shtml.
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bill.' 5 China regarded this move as trade protectionism.
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Domestically, the idea of

a carbon tax was explicitly rejected in June 2009 by NDRC.' °7
Both the cap-and-trade and carbon tax policies are incentive-based
instruments.'9 Incentive-based instruments are not a foreign idea in China; for
example, they are applied in the Renewable Energy Act of 2005 (REA),' °9 but with
limited success. Following the example of similar statutes in the West, the REA
recognizes a wide range of incentives necessary to encourage investment in
renewable energy: (a) guaranteed access to power grids;"' (b) purchase of electricity
produced at a price that is conducive to the development of renewable energy;.. (c)
a renewable energy development fund;"2 (d) low-interest loans;"3 and (e) tax
benefits."4 The REA acknowledges the importance of incentives; however, it does
not bet solely on the market mechanism. Most of its promises are vague and
ambiguous at best-for example, it is up to the State Council to decide the exact
price that electricity producers can charge."' In practice, the price is often low and
can barely cover the producers' costs."6 Pricing reform has been called for and
105. America's Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2009, H.R. 1337, 111th Cong. (2009).
106. Alan Beattie & Kathrin Hille, China Joins Carbon Tax Protest,FIN. TIMES, July 3, 2009, available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76fOe4b-67fc-llde-848a-00144feabdc.html?nclick-check=.
The signal was
sent earlier in March 2009, when U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu said during a Congressional hearing
that the United States should impose a carbon tax on imported products if other countries do not
implement similar policies. See Emission Tariff Proposal Rapped, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 20, 2009, at 1
(discussing China's response to Chu's statement that the United States would be at a disadvantage if it
limited carbon emissions, while other countries did not follow suit); see also Press Release, Comm. on
Science and Technology Republican Caucus, S&T Republicans Question Secretary Chu on Future of U.S.
Energy, (Mar. 17, 2009) (describing how, in response to questions from Republican Congressmen,
Secretary Chu stated that the United States would consider taxing carbon imports from China if China
failed to implement its own emission reduction policy).
107. See Ding Qingfen, Carbon Tariff "an Excuse" to Protect Trade, CHINA DAILY, July 4, 2009, at 1
(quoting a Ministry of Commerce statement denouncing the proposed carbon tariff as "trade protectionism
in the name of protecting the environment"); Zhang Jianping, Carbon Tax's Smoke and Mirrors, CHINA
DAILY, Aug. 24, 2009, at 4 (arguing that carbon tax being contemplated by the United States in its Clean
Energy and Security Act is an act of provocation that will spur a trade war, and imposes undue onus on
developing countries). China was joined by India on the attack on protectionism. See Amy Kazmin, India
Lambasts "Pernicious" U.S. Carbon Tariffs, FIN. TIMES, June 30, 2009 (discussing India's objection to the
import taxes as "trade penalties"); NDRC: China Will Not Consider a Carbon Tax Currently,
http://www.quamnet.com/newscontent.action?articleld=1257472.
108. See Tom Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, in ECONOMICS OF
THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS 279, 279-80 (Robert N. Stavins ed., 2005) (discussing how an
economic incentive approach to environmental regulation allows environmental goals to be accomplished
more cheaply and easily than strategies that reject market forces).
109. See generally Ke zai sheng neng yuan fa [Renewable Energy Act] (P.R.C.), supra note 35
(according to Article 24 the state will provide funds to support activities related to promoting renewable
energy; Article 26 provides tax incentives to programs included in the Guidance Directory for Renewable
Energy Industry).
110. Id. art. 14.
111. Id. art. 19.
112. Id. art. 24.
113. Id. art. 25.
114. Id. art. 26.
115. Qiang Wang, Huan-Ning Qiu, & Yaoqiu Kuang, Market-Driven Energy Pricing Necessary to
Ensure China's Power Supply, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 2498,2500-01 (2009).
116. Zhang Peidong, et al., Opportunities and Challengesfor Renewable Energy Policy in China, 13
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REv. 439, 445 (2009); Judith A. Cherni & Joanna Kentish,
Renewable Energy Policy and Electricity Market Reforms in China, 35 ENERGY POL'Y 3616, 3620-22
(2007).
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promised for many years, but the steps have been slow and limited."7 This is because
a change in pricing policy would not only have complicated impacts on energy, but
also on the economy as a whole, making it a politically sensitive issue.
Incentivizing technological upgrades in the vast energy, steel, cement, and other
industries in China would be difficult without a functional market mechanism. But it
is also questionable whether technology upgrades could be a workable solution even
with market incentives in place. A study conducted by the State Council's
Development Research Center, with assistance from NDRC's Energy Institute,
explored the ways to achieve energy efficiency in great detail."' It noted that while
technology offers great potential in the long term, its short term contribution to
energy efficiency-for the purpose of meeting the targets of 2010-would be
limited."9 In general, technology could contribute 30 percent of energy savings by
the end of 2010, which is about 520 million tons of coal equivalence (tce)' 2
To
facilitate technological improvement, the study recommended, it would be necessary
to use the government's administrative power to shut down the obsolete production
capacity in some key sectors, such as steel and thermal power."' This type of
government action seems more in line with the sense of great urgency displayed in
the socio-political sphere. In March 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao admitted in his
annual report to the legislature that the emission reduction plan for the year 2006
(the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan) did not succeed: energy intensity only2
decreased 1.2 percent, COD increased 1.2 percent, and SO, increased 1.8 percent.1
The Premier highlighted that various levels of government must strictly implement
environmental standards. In order to reduce energy consumption, the Premier
announced, the government must accelerate the elimination of the so-called
"backward production capacity" (luo hou chan neng), i.e., small-scale and low-tech

117. Cherni & Kentish, supra note 116, at 3617. See ANDREWS-SPEED, supra note 68, chs. 12, 14
(describing the government's efforts to reform and restructure the state electrical power sector, and
discussing whether those efforts have been enough to protect consumers); Julie Walton, Power Politics:
China Must Push Through Reforms in Its Energy Sector, Especially Price Reform, CHINA Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 8-14, availableat http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0509/walton.html.
118. ZHONGGUO KE CHI XU NENG YUAN-SHI SHI SHI Yi Wu 20% JIE NENG MU BIAO DE TU JING YU
CUO SHI YAN JIU [A STUDY OF APPROACHES AND METHODS TO MEET CHINA's 20% ENERGY
EFFICIENCY TARGET FOR 2010] (2008) (P.R.C.).

119.

See Zhang Xiliang, Li Zheng & He Jiankun, An Analysis of the Functions of Sustainable Energy

Technology, in ZHONGGUO KE CHI XU NENG YUAN-SHI SHI SHI YI WU 20% JiE NENG MU BIAO DE TU
JING YU CUO SHI YAN J1U [A STUDY OF APPROACHES AND METHODS TO MEET CHINA'S 20% ENERGY
EFFICIENCY TARGET FOR 2010], 185, 266-68 (2008) (P.R.C.) (describing how technology will be beneficial

in the long term, but to a lesser extent in the short term, to improve energy efficiency).
120. Id. at 268.
121. See Feng Fei, General Report on Approaches and Methods to Meet the Target of 20% Energy
Saving during the lth Five-Year Plan Period in Sustainable Energy, in ZHONGGUO KE CHI XU NENG
YUAN-SHI SHI SHI YI Wu 20% IE NENG MU BIAO DE TU JING YU CUO SHI YAN JIU [A STUDY OF
APPROACHES AND METHODS TO MEET CHINA'S 20% ENERGY EFFICIENCY TARGET FOR 2010] 1, 16-17

(2008) (suggesting that policies on shutting down the obsolete production capacity in sectors such as steel.,
thermal, etc. are "necessary and correct" but need improvement).
122. Premier Wen Jiabao, Report on the Work of the Government, Address at the Tenth National
People's Congress (Mar. 5, 2007), printed in PEOPLE'S DAILY, Mar. 6, 2007, available at
http://www.chinadaily.net/china/2007-03/17/content_830171.htm; see Jim Yardley, Chinese PremierFocuses
on Pollution and the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at Al (observing how Premier Wen's address
included China's "plans to shut down 'backward' steel and iron foundries and inefficient, polluting power
plants").
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steel and iron foundries and inefficient, polluting power plants.' 23

Specifically,

Premier Wen indicated a total of 50 megawatts worth of that capacity from smallscale thermal power generators must be closed down during the 11th Five-Year Plan
period; in 2007 alone, 10 megawatts of generating capacity worth of thermal power
generators must be shut down.'24 In the steel sector, 100 million tons of such capacity
must be eliminated, including 55 million tons for the year 2007.'" The Premier also
listed other sectors,
including cement, electrolytic aluminum, ferrous alloy, coke, and
26
calcium carbide.
B.

Regulatory Choice and Regulatory Agencies

Using law enforcement campaigns was also in the interests of key players in the
bureaucratic and economic structure. The two regulatory agencies most involved in
the campaigns were the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). Despite their differences on
other issues, both NDRC and MEP had vested interests in law enforcement
campaigns.
NDRC was a regulatory agency in charge of energy policy through its
subordinate, the National Energy Administration. Given its deeply embedded
interests in the energy sector, NDRC's predecessor, the State Planning Commission,
was not enthusiastic about climate change negotiations in the 1980s and early
1990s.'

However, under the new development strategy, NDRC saw opportunities

in the prospect of huge investment and subsidies to the new energy sector, i.e., wind,
solar, and nuclear power. There would also be opportunities to restructure and
upgrade the existing coal and coal-burn power sector. NDRC also has an Energy

Research Institute, one of the most influential think tanks on energy and climate
issues.'28
Under NDRC, China's electric power industry was dominated by five power
corporations and two power grid corporations (State Grid Corporation of China and

China South Power Grid Co.), which are all state-owned. 9

The five power

123. Premier Wen Jiabao, supra note 122 ("Industrial restructuring proceeded slowly, while growth in
heavy industry, especially in sectors that are high in energy consumption or are highly polluting, was still
overheated. Many backward production facilities that should have been closed down are still in
operation.").
124. Id. pt. 3 ("We plan to close down small thermal power plants with total power generating
capacity of 50 million kilowatts during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. The target for this year is to
close down small plants with a total capacity of 10 million kilowatts.").
125. Id. ("In addition, we plan to close down backward iron foundries with total production capacity
of 100 million tons and backward steel mills with total production capacity of 55 million tons during the
same five-year period ... .
126. Id.
127. See Elizabeth Economy, Two Front Diplomacy, supra note 25, at 27-28 (discussing the positions
of the Ministry of Energy and the State Planning Commission); Lester Ross, The Politicsof Environmental
Policy in the People's Republic of China, 20 POL'Y STUD. J. 628, 637 (1992) (noting the positions of the
State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance in the debate on global warming).
128. The Energy Research Institute of National Development and Reform Commission.,
http://www.eri.org.cn/e-indexl.asp?columnid=41&title=What's%2ONew (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). See
also, Elizabeth Economy, Two Front Diplomacy, supra note 25, at 28 (referencing the Energy Institute as a
part of NDRC).
129. Chunbo Ma & Lining He, From State Monopoly to Renewable Portfolio: Restructuring China's
Electric Utility, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 1697, 1703 (2008).
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conglomerates (the "Big Five") include: Huaneng Group, Datang Group, Huadian
Corporation, Guodian Group, and China Power Investment Corporation, each
serving a distinct geographical area of the country. In terms of accumulated
installation capacity, the Big Five accounted for 38.8 percent in 2006,"3° and up to
44.9 percent by the end of 2008."' The Big Five have their competitors below the
national level: power plants which are State-owned but operated by provincial or
county-level governments (45.0% in 2006; 39.5% in 2008), as well as private power
plants and foreign invested power plants (6.2% in 2006; 5.1% in 2008). 32 They also
compete with the Big Five for coal. This competition is a big factor in an economy
that is overwhelmingly dependent on coal as the primary source of energy-in 2008,
80.9 percent of the electricity was produced by coal-burning power plants.'33
In 1998, in the wake of the worldwide economic slowdown, an electricity
oversupply prompted a campaign to shut down small-sized thermal power units: all
power generators below 25 megawatts by the end of 1999 and all those below 50
megawatt by 2003.3 In April 2002, when the Big Five was just formed, the State
Council announced that China's electric power industry had entered into an era of
"big generators and big grid," and thus decided to launch another campaign
targeting 135 megawatt power generators.'35 In July 2004, the Big Five complained
about competition for coal and asked the State Council to take action. 6 In
November 2004, when NDRC was troubled by the "disorderly" power plant
projects, it proposed to the State Council closing down small and unauthorized
power plants.'37 Similarly, in the coal sector, the state's "macro policy" to close down
the local and small coal mines during the 2000s was at least partially motivated by an
attempt to protect large state-owned mines from competition from the local and
private mines. 3 '
130. STATE ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMM'N [SERC], ANNUAL REPORT ON ELECTRICITY
REGULATION (2006) 3 (2007), [hereinafter SERC Report 2006]
131. STATE ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMM'N [SERC], ANNUAL REPORT ON ELECTRICITY
REGULATION (2008) 6 (2009) [hereinafter SERC Report 2008].
132. Id.
133. Calculated based on figures provided in SERC Report 2008, supra note 131, at 12 (hydraulic
power, 16.41%; wind power, 0.37%; nuclear power, 2.00%). In 2006, those figures were thermal power,
83.17%, hydraulic power, 14.70%, nuclear power, 1.92%. SERC Report 2006 supra note 130, at 10.
134. Zhuan fa Guojia Jing Mao Wei guan yu ting xiao huo dian ji zu you guan wen ti yi jian de tong
zhi [Circular on State Economic and Trade Commission's Opinions on Shutting Down Small Thermal
Power Units] (promulgated by the Gen. Off. St. Council, May 15, 1999, effective May 15, 1999) 1999 GEN.
OFFICE STATE COUNCIL 44 (P.R.C.); Barbara A. Finamore & Tauna M. Szymanski, Taming the Dragon
Heads: Controlling Air Emissions from Power Plants in China-An Analysis of China's Air Pollution
Policy and Regulatory Framework, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,439, 11,441 (2002). The State Economic and
Trade Commission (SETC) was abolished in March 2003, and NDRC was created around the same time.
WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review: People's Republic of China, 58, WT/TPR/S/161 (Feb. 28, 2006),
availableat www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tpr-e/s161-2_e.doc - 2006-04-19.
135. Guan wu yan ge jin zhi wei gui jian she 13.5 wan qian wa ji yi xia huo dian ji zu de tong zhi
[Department of State Notice Concerning Ban on Construction of Power Generators Under 135
Megawatts], Apr. 15, 2002 (P.R.C.).
136. Wu da dian li ji tuan lian ming shang shu guo wu yuan pi shi ping yi mei dian mao dun [Five
Major Electric Companies Petition Department of State Concerning Coal Price Raise], CHINA INT'L BuS.
TIMES (P.R.C.), July 26, 2004.
137. Guo wu yuan pi zhuan fa zhan gai ge wei guan wu jian jue zhi zhi dian zhan xiang mu wu xu jian
she yi jian de jin ji tong [Department of State's Notice of Approval of NDRC's Stopping of Unruly
Proliferation of Power Plants], Nov. 24, 2004 (P.R.C.).
138. Fubing Su, The Political Economy of Industrial Restructuring in China's Coal Industry, 1992-
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The other regulatory agency interested in law enforcement campaigns is the
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP)."3 9 As the national regulatory agency
in charge of environment protection, the MEP has overwhelming responsibility but
not the corresponding personnel, financial resources, or political influence.' ° The
MEP is a result of efforts taken to strengthen the environmental regulatory structure
as a whole. MEP was set up in March 2008 and enjoys a higher status compared with
its predecessor, the State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA) . 4
Because of its limits, MEP can hardly regulate big players like the Big Five, who are
the biggest polluters. A July 2009 Greenpeace study found that in 2008 the top three
Chinese power corporations together emitted more than the total greenhouse gas
emissions of Great Britain in the same year.1 42 On the local level, the situation is no
better. The local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) are often underfunded
and poorly equipped and are ineffective in implementing national environmental
laws.'43 Largely controlled by local governments who are driven by economic
growth, the local EPB officials only pay lip-service to the environment.'"

1999, in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG
ERA 226, 227 (Barry Naughton & Dali Yang eds., 2004).
139. Press Release, Ministry of Environmental Protection, The l1th Five-Year Plan for the Building
of
National
Capacity
in
Environmental
Supervision
Approved,
(Apr.
15,
2008),
http://english.mep.gov.cn/News-service/news release/200804/t208421-121447.htm. (last visited Nov. 3,
2009).
140. Gang He, China's New Ministry of Environmental Protection Begins to Bark, but Still Lacks in
Bite, EARTHTRENDS, July 17, 2008, http://earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/321. (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
141. China.org.cn, Ministry of Environmental Protection Launched, http://www.china.org.cn/20 0 8 03/28/content_13743766.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
142. GREENPEACE CHINA, POLLUTING POWER: RANKING CHINA'S POWER COMPANIES 4 (2009),
available at http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/china/en/press/reports/power-ranking-report.pdf;
see
also Tania Branigan, China's Three Biggest Power Firms Emit more Carbon than Britain, Says Report,
GUARDIAN, July 29, 2009, at 16.
143. Barbara J. Sinkule and Leonard Ortolano have conducted detailed studies of environmental law
enforcement in Pearl River Delta areas in southern China in the early 1990s. They found that local
environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) were dependent on revenues collected from local firms (such as
those of the pollutant discharge fees) to finance their own activities and bureaucratic expansion. Thus, the
EPBs developed a close and symbiotic relationship with the local firms, and the EPBs' interest in "law
enforcement" was largely to keep the local firms paying the fees, rather than providing economic
incentives for industry to adopt better practice. In other words, the local EPBs played a "double agent"
role in the implementation game just as bureaucrats in other countries. See BARBARA J. SINKULE &
LEONARD ORTOLANO, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA 9-10, 158-59 (1995).
Barbara J. Sinkule and Leonard Ortolano suggested what they observed in China resembled that observed
by other scholars, such as Eugene Bardach. See generally EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION
GAME (1977) (tables and ideas throughout are referenced by Sinkule and Ortolano throughout their book
mentioned above). See also, Wanxin Li, Environmental Governance: Issues and Challenges, 36 ENVT'L. L.
REP. 10,505, 10,521-22 (2006) (discussing environmental problems, policy responses, and the work that
remains); ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT [OECD], ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND WAYS FORWARD (2006)
(OECD survey of the environmental regulatory framework and enforcement in China); Elizabeth C.
Economy, The Great Leap Backward? The Costs of China's Environmental Crisis, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 38,
50-53 (Sept.-Oct. 2007) (discussing lack of effective law enforcement on local levels). In March 2005,
SEPA and Environmental Defense Fund conducted a survey on the effectiveness of environment law
enforcement in China.
Lu XIN-YUAN, DANIEL J. DUDEK, ET AL., CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECIVE OF CAPACITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT IN
CHINA, CHINA COUNCIL OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE TASK FORCE, available at http://www.cet.net.cn/new/english/EGcase%20study-enforcement-en.pdf.
144. Yanqi Tong, Bureaucracy Meets the Environment: Elite Perceptions in Six Chinese Cities, 189
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Thus, national campaigns are also a policy tool for the MEP to mobilize
political resources in order to overcome resistance from big players or bureaucratic
inertia on local levels. "5 From 1996 to 2001, SEPA undertook a so-called "fifteen
smalls" campaigns which targeted fifteen small-scale firms such as paper mills
(annual output 5000 tons or below), tanneries (30,000 hides or below), dye works
(annual output 500 tons or below), small coal mines, thermal power plants, cement
factories, etc.46 SEPA reported that during 1996-2000 (the Ninth Five-Year Plan),
about 84,000 such small firms were shut down as a result of this campaign, which
"effectively reduced the total amount of pollutants.' ' 47 From 2001 to 2004, more
than 30,000 heavy-polluting or resource-wasting firms were declared obsolete. 8
More than 1,900 projects in polluting sectors such as steel and iron, cement,
chemical, etc. were stopped or postponed. 9
C.

Law Enforcement. Campaign Style

In 2005, closure campaigns resulted in the shutdown of more than 2,600 plants
in the cement, textile, paper-making, steel, and iron sectors.50 In December 2005,
the State Council issued "Provisional Regulations on Facilitating Industrial
Restructuring" (Regulations).' In the Chinese legal system a regulation issued by
the State Council has the binding force of law.'
The Regulations reiterated that a

CHINA Q. 100, 114 (2007); Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism, Chinese
Style: The PoliticalBasis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50 (1995).
145. Benjamin van Rooij witnessed the law enforcement campaigns between 2001 and 2004 in the city
of Kunming, Yunnan Province and observed that national campaigns provided local EPB officials the
opportunity to bargain with local governments as well as polluters. Benjamin van Rooij, Implementation of
Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and PoliticalCampaigns,37 DEV. & CHANGE 57,65-66
(2006).
146. Guo wu yuan guan yu huan jing bao hu ruo gan wen ti de jue ding [Decision on Several Issues on
Environmental Protection], Aug 3, 1996 (P.R.C.), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/200503/14/content_2696239.htm. In January 1999, the SETC published a list of the "obsolete production
capacity." See State Economic & Trade Commission (SETC), Guo shi sheng chang liang de mu lu, gong ye
guo cheng he chan pin [Catalogue of Obsolete ProductionCapacity, IndustrialProcessesand Products],Jan.
22, 1999 (P.R.C.), available at http://beian.hndrc.gov.cnl%5Bl%5D.htm; SETC published a second list in
December 1999, available at http://beian.hndrc.gov.cn/2%5Bl%5D.htm; and a third one in June 2002,
available at http://beian.hndrc.gov.cn/3%5Bl%5D.htm.
147. Miao Hong, China Battles Pollution Amid Full-speed Economic Growth, Embassy of the
People's Republic of China in the Czech Republic, Nov. 20, 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cecz/cze/
rdzt/srocpss/t276973.htm. See also Bai pi shu you guan yu zhong guo de huan jing bao hu 1996-2005
[White Paper on China's Environmental Protection 1996-2005] pt. II (issued by the Info. Off. State
Council
June
5,
2006)
(P.R.C.),
available
at
http://daxinganling.china.com.cn/english/MATERIAL/170403.htm (explaining Chinese strategies for the
prevention and control of industrial pollution).
148. INFO. OFF. OF THE STATE COUNCIL (P.R.C.), ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN CHINA (2006)
(P.R.C.), available at http://daxinganling.china.com.cn/english/MATERIAL/170403.htm.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Cu jin chan ye jie gou tiao zheng zan xing gui ding [Provisional Regulations on Facilitating
Industrial Restructuring] (promulgated by State Council, Dec. 2, 2005, effective on Dec. 2, 2005) 2005
STATE COUNCIL 40 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbqt/zcfb2005/t2005122254302.htm.
152. Li fa fa [Legislation Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l. People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July
1, 2000) 2000 NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. 31 arts. 9, 11 (P.R.C.) (giving authority to the National People's
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compulsory closure policy would be enforced against those low-tech, energy-

consuming, and heavily-polluting firms, industrial processes, or products., 3
NDRC was actively engaged in closure campaigns in 2007.
Pressure was
M

mounting inside NDRC: in March 2007, the Premier was forced to acknowledge that
the goal for 2006 was not achieved, and in July, NDRC publicized the nation's first

national program on climate change. On January 20, 2007, this policy of compulsory
closure became more formalized as "promoting the big and quashing the small"
(shang da ya xiao) when the State Council endorsed another of NDRC's closure

proposals. "' "Promoting the big" refers to bigger (typically with capacity of 600
megawatts) and more efficient power plants employing supercritical (SC) or ultrasupercritical (USC) technology.1 6 An April 2009 joint report by the International
Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) suggests that about ninety-five SC or USC units with a
capacity of 600 megawatts or more had been put into operation by mid-2007, with
another seventy units due for commissioning before 2010.157 However, the
IEA/OECD report notes that the share in total coal-fired generation capacity of all
types of SC plants is about twelve percent, significantly smaller than the United
States' thirty percent.'
Thus, it appeared to NDRC officials that "quashing the
small" was still necessary to achieve the restructuring goal. A national conference
was quickly convened on the issue of "promoting the big and quashing the small" in
the electricity sector. 9 Chen Deming, then Deputy Minister of NDRC, pressed the
provincial electric utility officials and executives from the Big Five and the two

Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee to authorize the State Council to formulate administrative
regulations; Article 11 provides that the NPC or its Standing Committee can make a law replacing the
regulation); see also Laura Paler, China's Legislation Law and the Making of a More Orderly and
Representative Legislative System, 182 CHINA Q. 301 (June 2005) (describing and commenting on the
background of the Law on Legislation); see generally Li Yahong, The Law-making Law: A Solution to the
Problems in the Chinese Legislative System?, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 120 (2000) (discussing the symbolic,
rather than practical, role of the Law on Legislation).
153. Provisional Regulations on Facilitating Industrial Restructuring, supra note 151, art. 9.
154. Estelf Reyes, Challenges for Effective Policy Implementation Toward a Sustainable Coal Sector in
China 27 (China Environmental Science & Sustainability (CESS): UBC-Research Group, Working Paper
No.
1,
2007),
http://www.iar.ubc.ca/centres/ccr/ccrresearchandpublications/researchprojects/cess/
cessworkingpapers/tabid/248/itemid/43/default.aspx.
155. Guo wu yuan pi zhuan fa zhan gai ge wei neng yuan ban guan yu jia kuai guan ting xiao huo dian
ji zu ruo gan yi jian de tong zhi [Circular on Approval of National Development and Reform Commission
and Energy Office's Opinions on Shutting Down Small-Scale Thermal Power Plants] (issued by the St.
Council, Jan. 20, 2007, effective Jan. 20, 2007) ST. COUNCIL 2 (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-01/26/content_509911 .htm.
156. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY [IEA] & ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. [OECD],
CLEANER COAL IN CHINA 101 (2009) [hereinafter CLEANER COAL IN CHINA] ("[A]mong new power
generation projects, 600 megawatt units now dominate," and "about 60% of the new-builds in China are
supercritical units"); see also Keith Bradsher, China Outpaces U.S. in Cleaner Coal-Fired Plants, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/ll/world/asialllcoac.html
(suggesting that some of the new thermal power plants built in China can achieve an efficiency of 44%,
while the most efficient plants in the United States achieve around 40% efficiency).
157. CLEANER COAL IN CHINA, supra note 156, at 101.
158. In comparison, the IEAIOECD report notes that the share of supercritical units in coal-fired
generation capacity is about 70% in Japan and 30% in the United States. Id.
159. See China to Close Small Power Generating Units in Four Years, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Jan. 30, 2007,
http:llenglish.people.com.cn2007011301print20070130_345910.htm (recounting that representatives from
the power industry and over 30 provinces attended a meeting in which they signed documents confirming
their intent to close small power-generating plants).
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power grids to sign individual undertakings that they would close down small power
plants under their control.'"
During the law enforcement campaign period, NDRC most actively deployed
the narrative that new generators (mostly owned by the "Big Five") represent
efficiency and environmental responsibility, while small and locally-controlled
generators were identified with pollution, the wasting of natural resources, and
disruption of the State's plans. NDRC senior officials repeatedly justified campaigns
in environmental terms. If all the electricity generators with small capacity were to
be replaced by the higher capacity generators, 90 million tons of coal could be saved,
and 1.8 million tons of SO 2 and 220 million tons of CO2 could be reduced every
year.16

In November 2007, the "11th Five-Year Plan on Environmental Protection,' 62
jointly prepared by NDRC and SEPA, was approved by the State Council. SEPA is
also engaged in its own environmental law enforcement campaigns. 163 In June 2008,
the Ministry of Environmental Protection, which succeeded SEPA in March,
announced that total emissions of SO 2 in 2007 had been brought under control.16'
Zhou Shengxian, Minister of the MEP, attributed the "success" in part to the law
enforcement campaigns, stating that the "reductions were achieved by the
application of the pollution control measures, as well as the closure of some outdated
plants that consumed too much energy., 165 By July 2008, statistics on this particular
campaign on thermal generators were compiled in a "Release on Closing of Small
Thermal Generators in the Year 2007."' 6 It showed that a total of 553 generator

160. Zhang Yi, Jie neng jiang hao 20% mu biao you ci tu po [Conserving Energy and Reducing
Consumption Starts from Here], GUANGMING DAILY (P.R.C.), Jan. 30, 2007, at 5, available at
http://www.gmw.cn/Olgmrb/2007-01/30/content_543139.htm.
161. Chen Deming, Vice Minister of the Nat'l. Dev. & Reform Comm'n., Jin yi bu tui jin 'cu jin da he
che xiao xiao', guan che jiang di neng yuan xiao hao yu pai fang de ren wu [Further Push Forward
'Promoting the Big and Quashing the Small', Carry out the Task of Reducing Energy Consumption and
Emissions], speech (Mar. 5, 2007), http://zys.ndrc.gov.cn/wldzyjh/t20070305_19751.htm [hereinafter
Deming].
162. Guo wu yuan guan yu yin fa guo jia huan jing bao hu "Shi Yi Wu" gui hua de tong zhi [Notice on
the Issuance of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan on Environmental Protection] (issued by the St. Council, Nov.
22, 2007, effective Nov. 22, 2007) 2007 ST. COUNCIL 37 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/200711/26/content_815498.htm.
163. In September 2007, in order to curb pollution of the Tai Lake, Wuxi city closed down 1,340
polluting factories. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, In China, a Green Awakening: City Clamps Down on the
Polluting Factories That Built Its Economy, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2007, at Al. In northern China's Liaoning
province, the provincial government closed down 225 firms along Liao River in April, and another 42
paper mills in July 2008. Where to Start to Control Liaohe Basin Pollution? Liaoningfurther Closes Down
Papermills,CHINA ENV'T NEWS (P.R.C.), July 31, 2008, at 1.
164. Luo Changping, Beijing Battles for Blue Sky Olympics, CAIJING MAGAZINE, Oct. 9, 2007,
available at http://english.caijing.com.cn/2007-10-09/100032851.html ("Beijing decision-makers are most
concerned about airborne particulates and ozone, which are among the five, critical ingredients for
determining air quality levels. The others - carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide - are
considered well under control."); see also Keith Bradsher, China Reports Declines in 3 Major Pollutants,
Reversing Trend, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at A12 (reporting that that total emissions of sulfur dioxide
declined by 4.66% in 2007, reversing the trend of 2006).
165. New Green Measures "Reaping Rewards", CHINA DAILY, Nov. 19, 2008, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2008-11/19/content7217467.htm.
166. 2007 nian du guan ting xiao huo dian ji zu qing kuang tong bao [Release on Closing of Small
Thermal Generators in the Year 20071 (issued by St. Elec. Reg. Comm'n and Nat'l. Dev. & Reform
Comm'n, July, 2008) ST. ELEC. REG. COMM'N. AND DEV. & REFORM COMM'N. (P.R.C.) [hereinafter,
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units had been shut down in 2007 with a total capacity of 14.38 megawatts, which was
more than the plan had provided.16 ' Among these generators, seventy-nine percent
were coal-fired generators.' 6 Most of the generators were aged ones, with fortyseven percent of them (193 units) being more than thirty years old; and the average
age of the units was twenty-seven years old.1 69 The Release claims the campaign was
a great success: the 2007 campaigns reduced an equivalent of 1.88 million tons of
standard coal, which resulted in reduction of 290,000 tons of SO2 and 37.60 million
tons of CO 2 emissions. Encouraged by the new development, the MEP, NDRC,
and six other regulatory agencies convened a special national conference in July
2008, where it was171concluded that law enforcement campaigns would continue for
another five years.
Campaigns in 2007 were not limited to the electricity sector. In 2007, the
government announced their plan for phasing out "backward production facilities"
in thirteen industries by 2010. The plan included the elimination of "46.59 million
tons of obsolete iron-smelting capacity, 37.47 million tons of steelmaking capacity
and 52 million tons of cement production capacity." The government also ordered
the shutdown of "[miore than 2,000 heavily polluting papermaking plants,
chemical
7
plants, and printing and dyeing mills ...[and] 11,200 small coal mines.'
D.

Regulatory Choice and the Politics of Governance

What are the regulatory techniques to achieve "success"? As discussed above,
political considerations imposed limits on the regulatory instruments that may
otherwise be available. Both cap-and-trade and carbon tax are rejected by reason of
international politics. Other regulatory instruments were proposed and favorably
considered by SEPA before and during the law enforcement campaigns, but they
were rejected as well. A key factor in a successful regulatory design is the degree to
which different stakeholders are brought into the regulatory or enforcement
process.'73
SERC & NDRC, "Release" (2008)].
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Press Release, Ministry of Environment Protection P.R.C., State Council's Eight Departments
Convened at the National Environment Protection Campaign Tele-conference (July 10, 2008).
172. ST. COUNCIL INFO. OFF., CHINA'S POLICIES AND ACTIONS FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE
CHANGE 21 (2008) (Beijing), available at http://www.ccchina.gov.cn[WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File4l9.pdf.
173. See generally NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 93-134 (1998) (discussing the importance of including various nongovernmental parties in the regulatory process). I am grateful to my colleagues Professors Veronica Taylor
and Jane Winn for recommending the book and sharing their thoughts with me. See generally DAVID
VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE
UNITED STATES (1986) (comparing regulatory styles of the environmental policies of the United States
and Great Britain); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF
PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (1995) (comparing the regulatory styles of the

environmental policies of the United States and Germany); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL
LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); Gjalt Huppes & Robert A. Kagan, Market-Oriented
Regulation of Environmental Problems in the Netherlands, 11 LAW & POL'Y 215 (1989). For a more
sociological study of the relationship between environmental regulation and social movement, see
generally JOHN S. DRYZEK, ET AL., supra note 23.
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The first example of a successful regulatory design was the "Green GDP"
experiment between 2004 and 2007. The World Bank and United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP) supported the effort. In fact, the World Bank
concluded that a conservative estimate of total air and water pollution costs was $54
billion a year, or roughly eight percent of GDP in its 1997 report Clear Water, Blue
Skies.
Starting in 2004, SEPA worked with the National Bureau of Statistics of
China (NBS) on Green National Accounting (also known as "Green GDP") . In
September 2006, SEPA and NBS jointly issued China's first report on the impact of
the environment on the economy entitled "China Green National Accounting Study
Report 2004. ,176 The report, which involved forty-one areas of investigation,
revealed that pollution caused losses of 511.8 billion yuan in 2004, accounting for
3.05 percent of the GDP that year. The report was met with fierce opposition from
local officials and, perhaps more fatal, skepticism from NDRC and other agencies on
the national level. NDRC expressed explicit skepticism of the practicality of Green
GDP by publishing an article in 2004 entitled "The Concept, Methodology and
Practice of Green GDP" in China Economic Trade Herald, a journal controlled by
NDRC itself.17 By early 2007, some local governments had withdrawn from pilot
79
experiments with Green GDP, and hope for adopting it was fading.
Environmentalists at the All-China Environment Federation (a national NGO
backed by SEPA) appealed to NDRC for help. 8 °
Second, SEPA worked on and pushed for a law passed in 2002 called the
Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIAA),181 which explicitly requires that
174. WORLD BANK, CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES: CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT IN THE NEW CENTURY
23 (1997). The report devoted a whole chapter on the valuation of environmental costs, available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServerfWDSP/IB/1997/09/01000009265-3980
203115520/Rendered/PDF/multi-page.pdf.
175. Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, Gov.cn, Green GDP Accounting Study Report 2004
Issued, http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-09/11/content_384596.htm.
176. STATE ENVT. PROT. AGENCY [SEPA] & NAT'L. BUREAU OF STATISTICS [NBS], A STUDY
REPORT ON CHINA ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING IN 2004, http://www.caep.org.cn/
english/paper/China-Environment-and-Economic-Accounting-Study-Report-2004.pdf.
177. Id. at 11.
178. The article was published in the name of NDRC's subordinate Division of National Economy,
which is responsible for monitoring and analyzing domestic macro-economy and macro-economic forecast.
Lii Se GDP de gai nian fang fa he shi jian [The Concept, Methodology and Practiceof Green GDP], 16
ZHONGGUO JIN MAO DAO KAN [CHINA ECONOMIC TRADE HERALD] (2004), available at
http:llwww.eedu.org.cn/Article/es/envir/edevelopment/200804/24431.html.
Elizabeth Economy, China
From The Inside: Opinion: Green GDP, transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/kqed/chinainside/
nature/greengdp.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2009) (discussing oppositions from local governments).
179. Lii se GDP zao yu zu liru he hua lie [How to Resolve the Resistance to Green GDP], BEIJING
NEWS, Dec. 11, 2006, availableat http://news.qq.com/a20061211/000239.htm.
180. Zhong hua huan bao lian he hui fu mi shu zhang Li Hengyuan: yong lv se GDP laikao cha zheng
ji [China Environment Federation Vice Secretary- General Li Hengyuan: to examine the performance
using green GDP], Interview by China.com.cn with Li Hengyuan, Deputy Secretary-General, All-China
Environment
Federation
(ACEF),
in
Beijing,
P.R.C.
(June
29,
2007),
http://webcast.china.com.cn/webcast/created/1333/911_0101_desc.htm.
181. Huan jing ying xiang ping jia fa [Environmental Impact Assessment Act] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l. People's Cong. Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003) 2002 STANDING COMM.
NAT'L. PEOPLE'S CONG. 77 (P.R.C.); Zhang Yong, Controls on Construction Pollution to Tighten, CHINA
DAILY, Mar. 2, 2002. The basic statute, the Environmental Protection Act of 1989, does not prescribe any
opportunity for the public to be involved in the EIA process; rather, EIA was solely dependent on the local
EPB's review of the EIA report. Huan jing bao hu fa [Environmental Protection Act] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l. People's Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989) 1989 STANDING COMM.
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public hearings or other forms of consultation be held to seek comments from the
general public and interested parties.

campaigns in order to publicize EIAA.

In late 2004 SEPA launched high-profile

A more high-profile event occurred in

January 2005, when SEPA issued an order to halt thirty large-scale hydraulic and

thermal power projects for not having met environmental impact assessment
requirements. SEPA's actions became known as the "environmental storm."' ' 83
Between 2005 and 2007, SEPA initiated three rounds of "environmental storms.'
Despite all the publicity, however, SEPA remains a politically weak government
agency with limited resources. An incident in Xiamen City, southern China,
occurred in the midst of the "environmental storms."' In 2006, NDRC approved a
$1.4 billion dollar chemical factory in Xiamen.'
When local residents found out,
they challenged the project, claiming it violated the EIAA. They even appealed to
SEPA for help, but SEPA was able to offer little assistance to the residents.8 6 It was

only after a surprising collective action-millions of cell phone text messages-that
local government started organizing public hearings. In January 2009, the chemical
project was relocated. 7
Thus, in the domestic context, SEPA was not able to push through the
regulatory instruments it favored.""' Bureaucratically, this only reveals the fact that

NAT'L. PEOPLE'S CONG. 22 (P.R.C.); Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China
(1989), 37 CHINESE L. & GOV'T. 58-65 (May/June 2004). In November 2004, SEPA issued a specific
regulation on the EIA approval process to implement the EIAA. Gui ding you guan yu huan jing ying
xiang ping gu de xing wei shou ze [Provisions on Code of Conduct for Environmental Impact Assessment]
(issued by the St. Envtl. Protection Agency Nov. 23, 2005) (P.R.C.).
182. Ching-Ching Ni, China Environment Agency Takes On Giant Dam Corporation,L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2005, at A3; CRISIS AND BREAKTHROUGH OF CHINA'S ENVIRONMENT 3-18 (Liang Congjie &
Yang Dongping eds. 2007); Jian Yang, Understanding China's "Environmental Protection Storm," 30 N.Z.
INT'L REV. 17 (2005).
183. Thomas R. Johnson, New Opportunities, Same Constraints: Environmental Protection and
China's New Development Path,28 POLITICS 93, 97 (2008).
184. Edward Cody, Text Messages Giving Voice to Chinese: Opponents of Chemical Factory Found
Way around Censors, WASH. POST, June 28, 2007, at Al. Inside China, the incident was widely reported by
mainstream media, which played a key role in pressing the local governments. See, for example, Xiamen
PX xiang mu: Xu jian, ting jian hai shi qian jian [Xiamen PX Project: Should It be Suspended, Postponed,
or Relocated?], REN MIN RI BAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY] (P.R.C.), Dec. 19, 2007, at 5, available at
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-12-19/044314552686.shtml.
185. Jianguo
Liu
&
Jared
Diamond,
Revolutionizing
China's
Environmental
Protection,SCIENCE, Jan. 4, 2008, at 38.
186. It is reported that SEPA officials met representatives of the Xiamen residents on March 14, 2007,
and indicated that SEPA could not help them because the project had been approved by NDRC. Xiamen
PX Project May Turn Sour, Some Say It Is an Asymmetrical Game, CHINA ECON. TIMES, June 6, 2007,
available at http://gov.ce.cn/china/gy/200706/09/t20070609_1669340.shtml.
Earlier, in 2003 and 2004,
during the Nu River controversy, SEPA had a brief "alliance" with environmental NGOs. See Yanfei Sun
& Dingxin Zhao, Multifaceted State and Fragmented Society: Dynamics of Environmental Movement in
China, in DISCONTENTED MIRACLE: GROWTH, CONFLICT, AND INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN CHINA
111, 132-44 (Dali L. Yang ed. 2007) (detailing the SEPA-ENGO alliance during the Nu River
Controversy).
187. Zhang Xin & Hu Meidong, PX Plant Cleared, to Shift to Zhangzhou, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 14,
2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-01/14/content-7394303.htm;
Andrew Jacobs, Chinese
Chemical Plant Site Moves after Outcry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at A9, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/world/asia/15fujian.html.
188. SEPA also worked with China Insurance Regulatory Commission in promoting "environmental
liability insurance." Sun Xiaohua, Polluters Urged to Buy Green Insurance,CHINA DAILY, Feb. 19, 2008, at
3; Yue, supra note 103. In December 2008, China Environment News, the newspaper controlled by MEP,
reported the first successful settlement in Hunan between victims of pollution (120 villagers) and local
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NDRC is playing a more decisive role in shaping China's climate change policy. The
regulatory instrument chosen in the campaigns was rather a more direct control
mechanism-the cadre system. "Cadre" (ganbu), a transplant from the early Soviet
bureaucratic system, is broader than civil service. It covers a wide range of
personnel with administrative responsibilities in the government, the Communist
Party, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).'89 Cadres are essentially controlled from
above. Personnel promotion, dismissal, transfers (between levels of government,
such as province to county), etc., are, like the price signal in the market for the
merchant, the basic driving force in the bureaucratic structure. During the three
decades of reform, the most crucial decision-making criterion used by top leadership
to evaluate cadres has been GDP, i.e., economic performance. Thus the cadre
evaluation system became the dynamic of China's economic liberalization.'90 One
key measure during the law enforcement campaigns, discussed earlier, was to add
specific closure targets to the cadres of different levels, and then use those targets to
measure the performance of each cadre. Thus, one fundamental method used to
measure cadre performance during the law enforcement campaigns, discussed above,
was to assign the cadres specific closure targets at different levels, and then use those
targets to gauge the performance of each cadre. The Big Five are all state-owned,
thus their executives are also cadres who are subject to the disciplines of the cadre
evaluation system. In his March 2007 speech, Chen Deming instructed provincial
officials to put closure plans on the agenda and use the targets provided in the
undertakings as bases for evaluation purposes. ' On a more general level, energy
efficiency and emission reduction were also broken down into individual targets for
each province, municipality, and SOE under the central government. The State
Council in "General Working Program for Energy Conservation and Emission
Reduction," a program drafted by NDRC, made it clear that energy conservation
and emission reduction would be integral parts of the evaluation criteria for
assessing the performance of cadres.' 92 Furthermore, the State Council granted the

chemical and non-ferrous factories that were covered by environment liability insurance in a pilot project.
Quan guo shou li huan jing wu ran ze ren xian huo pei [Nation's FirstEnvironment Pollution Compensation
Covered by Insurance], ZHONGGUO HUAN JING BAO [CHINA ENVIRONMENT NEWS] (P.R.C.), Dec. 1,
2008, available at http://www.cenews.com.cn/hbgov/news/200908/t20090819_.621747.html. But it is unclear,
from the vantage point of mid-2009, whether there is any chance that "environmental liability insurance"
will be formally adopted soon.
189. Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, China's Cadres and Cadre Management System, in DAMAGE CONTROL:
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE JIANG ZEMIN ERA 209, 209-31 (Gungwu Wang & Yongnian
Zheng eds. 2003); Susan Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grassroots: The Paradox of Party
Rule, in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG

ERA 101, 101-19 (Barry Naughton & Dali Yang eds., 2004).
190. Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Managementfrom a
Township Perspective, 173 CHINA Q. 39 (2003); Maria Heimer, The Cadre Responsibility System and the
Changing Needs of the Party, in THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN REFORM 122, 122-38 (Kjeld Erik
Brodsgaard & Yongnian Zheng eds., 2006); See Deming, supra note 161 (describing how the cadre
evaluation system now includes assessing whether government officials have succeeded in promoting the
big and squashing the small to improve energy efficiency).
191. Deming, supra note 161.
192. Guan yu yin fa jie neng jian pai zong he xing gong zuo fang an de tong zhi [Notice on the General
Working Program for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction] (promulgated by the St. Council,
June 3, 2007, effective June 3, 2007) 2007 ST. COUNCIL 15 (P.R.C.).
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NRDC "veto power" (yipiaofoujue), which meant that a cadre would fail his/her job
if he/she did not do well on energy conservation and emission reduction.'9

A law enforcement campaign is chosen as the regulatory instrument because it
serves political functions. First, it is a convenient tool that can serve the immediate
purpose of lowering energy consumption more quickly than market forces or
technological advances. In this aspect, climate change policy is just another example
of China's crisis-driven governance style. Second, it has enormous symbolic value,
both domestically and internationally. Third, a campaign is also an opportunity to
consolidate power and tighten control. All of these elements were on full display

during one event in the campaign: two 100-Megawatt generator units were
demolished in January 2007, at Anyang City, Henan province in central China. It
was called the "first explosion" in the 2007 campaign."' Quickly, newspapers in
other provincial
capitals across the country started reporting their own first
9
explosions.

E.

The Regulatory Climate and Its Persistence

The law enforcement campaigns under the new developmental strategy are an
integral part of China's general regulatory climate in the 2000s. This is a period of
time in which China is experiencing the coming of a "risk society"-food safety
crisis, environment pollution, pandemic, poor working conditions, financial frauds in
the securities market.'96 Law enforcement campaigns were instituted in response to

these crises to crack down on crimes and shut down illegal factories, unsafe coal
mines, and outdated electricity generators.'97 The general pattern of crisis-driven
governance is a theatrical state, with a great deal of continuity with previous law

enforcement campaigns.198 The Party-State manages to stay in power by performing
these political dramas. Often law enforcement campaigns as a regulatory instrument
are not one-shot games. They are typically launched in response to an earlier crisis
and followed by a declaration of victory. The victory is not the conclusion of the
193. Id.
194. SERC & NDRC, "Release" (2008), supra note 166, pt II.
195. See Official Website of Anhui, China, First Explosion for Emission Reduction of Anhui, June 25,
2007, http://apps.ah.gov.cn/govstruct/showcontent.asp?newsid=853 (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (describing
how the demolition of two 50,000 kilowatt thermal power plants on June 22, 2007 signified the
implementation of emission reduction plans in the Anhui, China).
196. Austin Ramzy, Will China's New Food-Safety Laws Work? TIME, Mar. 3, 2009; Carin Zissis,
China's EnvironmentalCrisis, WASH. POST, Aug. 7,2008; Jonathan Schwartz & R. Gregory Evans, Causes
of Effective Policy Implementation: China's Public Health Response to SARS, 16 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 195,
195-213 (2007); Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospectsfor Regulatory Innovation
in the People's Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1050, 1050-1053 (2007); Yang Zhen, Audit
Uncovers 6b Yuan in Financial Fraud, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 19, 2009. For an exploration of the "risk
society" theory see ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter trans.,
1992) (1986).
197. See, e.g., China.org, 213 Factories Shut Down for Heavy Pollutions, Oct. 6, 2006,
http://china.org.cn/English/environment/183013.htm; Three Killed, Three Injured in NE China Mine Blast,
XINHUA, May 19, 2007, http:/lnews.xinhuanet.comEnglish2007-O5/19/content_6122650.htm; China power
coal reserves in major plants hit new high, XINHUA, Sept. 20, 2008, http:l/newslxinhuanet.comEnglish/200809/20/content_10083682.htm.
198. Cf. Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 6, 7-9 (2003) (comparing
China's history of dramatic power transfers with recent times: "Never before in PRC history has there
been a succession whose arrangements were fixed this far in advance, remained so stable to the end, and
whose results so unambiguously transferred power from one generation of leaders to another.").
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campaign but merely a break before the next campaign is started. A claim of success
anticipates the beginning of a new round of campaigns, perhaps on an even larger
scale.
Along with the closure campaigns came an aggressive investment in new
technology or new areas such as renewable energy, mostly by state-owned firms such
as the Big Five. After the Central Economic Work Conference in 2004 investments
and subsidies were poured into hydraulic power, solar, wind, biomass, clean coal
technology, etc. I9 In 2007, when it was actively engaged in closure campaigns
described above, NDRC issued an ambitious "Mid- and Long-term Development
Plan for Renewable Energy" in September2 O specifying targets for each new energy
source and investment plan. By the end of the year, total investment in renewable
energy reached $12 billion,2"' second only to the United States. Among the
renewable energy sources, wind power got so much attention that China has doubled
its installed capacity every year since 2004. In 2008, China again doubled its
installed capacity by adding about 6.3 GW to reach a total of 12.2 GW,making
China the fourth highest ranked nation in the world in terms of wind power installed
capacity.2° A recent example is that a 10 GW wind farm in Jiuquan, Gansu
Province, northwest China, has just started construction. 3 In July 2009, NDRC
announced revised and more ambitious targets under which renewable energy is
expected to account for ten percent of the country's energy resources by 2010 and
fifteen percent by 2020.24 In August 2009, even in the midst of global economic
recession, the government announced that more than 15 percent of the country's 4
trillion yuan ($586 billion) stimulus package will be spent on cutting carbon
emissions by the end of 2010.205
In an era in which all the attention of climate change diplomacy is focused on
targets and timetables, the numbers from China impressed foreign observers. The
Climate Group, a London-based NGO, hailed China's domestic energy policy as a
"Clean Revolution., 026 In some of the progressive and climate-conscious newspapers

199. Zhang, et al., supra note 116, at 440-44 (discussing financial and tax policy developed in this
period to encourage renewable energy).
200. Guan yu yin fa ke zai sheng neng yuan zhong chang qi fa zhan gui hua de tong zhi [Notice on
Issuing the Mid- and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy] (promulgated by the Nat'l.
Dev. & Reform Comm'n., Aug. 31, 2007, effective Aug. 31, 2007) 2007 NAT'L. DEV. & REFORM COMM'N.
2174 (P.R.C.).
201. Press Release, The Climate Group, China Unleashes Clean Revolution (July 31, 2008),
http://www.theclimategroup.org/news-and-events/china-unleashescleanrevolution/.
202. GLOBAL WIND ENERGY COUNCIL (GWEC), GLOBAL WIND 2008 REPORT 9 (2009); see also Xia
Changliang & Song Zhanfeng, Wind Energy in China: Current Scenario and Future Perspectives, 13
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1966, 1967 (2009) (stating that China has made "pronounced
leaps" in its wind power capacity, ranking fifth internationally in 2007).
203. Zhang Qi, China's First of 7 Mega Wind Farms Ready to Start Rolling, CHINA DAILY, July 07,
2009, at 13, availableat http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-07/07/content_8885497.htm.
204. Fu Jing, China Considers Higher Renewable Energy Targets, CHINA DAILY, July 06, 2009.
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cnlbizchina/2009-07/06/content_8380826.htm.
205. Fu Jing & Li Xiaokun, Billions from Stimulus Tagged to Cut Emissions, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 6,
2009, at 1,availableat http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-08/06/content_8530262.htm.
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in the West, sensational headlines appeared, such as "China is catching up!" Tony
Blair, former British Prime Minister who leads the Climate Group, visited China and
praised China's energy policy, knowing his comments would be used by the official
media in China as a message of assurance to the world.2 0 Missing in the headlines is
the governance component in the discussion of "risk society," which is a central
argument in the "ecological modernization" movement led by Ulrich Beck, Anthony
Giddens, Gert Spaargaren, Arthur P.J. Mol, Frederick H. Buttel, and others.2 ' For
Beck, risks in the West become "the motor of... self-politicization ...in industrial
society," organized in the form of the welfare state.2°0 This "self-politicization" is the
ultimate shift towards a "new political culture" where citizens are mobilized in social
movements, which is all part of the "unbinding of politics. '210 This process is in line
with the more sociological theory used by John S. Dryzek and his colleagues in their
study of the link between social movements and the "green states" (countries that
adopt environment-friendly policies). 21' Dryzek found that social movements are the
necessary radical driving force pushing forward Green policy.
Dryzek and
colleagues compared the United States, Germany, Norway, and Great Britain. They
found that, in the United States since the 1980s, major national NGOs have become
"professionalized" and too focused on federal policy, thus losing connection with
their grassroots social movements.212 Germany maintained an active Green public
sphere and social movement, which served the necessary pressure and
transformative power in its relations with the state."'
At the core of "ecological modernization" theory is neither capital nor
technology, but governance. Beck's genius is that he saw risks, a threat ubiquitous in
modern social life, as the ultimate "motor"-a renewable energy-for bringing life
to governance in the political process. Thus, Beck's notion of "risk" is totally in line
with the Daoist notion of "weii"- which means danger (wei) and opportunity (ji).
on behalf of the Climate Group to meet with Premier Wen Jiabao to discuss China's new target goals. See
Mark Hughes, China, U.S. Committed, Says Blair, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 21, 2009, at 2, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-08/21/content_8596971.htm
(Blair believes that the Chinese
leadership is committed tackling the climate crisis and to reaching an agreement in Copenhagen).
207. See Hughes, supra note 206 (quoting Tony Blair's comments noting China's commitment to
addressing climate change).
208. See BECK, supra note 196, at 230-31 (suggesting that with the ecological modernization
movement, new intermediate forms of mutual governance are a superior alternative to a "guiding political
control center"); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 211,226 (2009) (arguing for
the return of multilateralism and "coalitions of the willing" in pursuit of climate change adaptation); Gert
Spaargaren et al., Introduction: Globalization, Modernity and the Environment, in THE ENVIRONMENT
AND GLOBAL MODERNITY 1 (Gert Spaargaren et. al., eds., 2000) (explaining that emerging local-global
relationships that are a byproduct of globalization, force the redefining of concepts and prove that the
nation-state is no longer the starting point for social systems); Arthur P.J. Mol & Gert Spaargaren,
Environment, Modernity and the Risk-society: The Apocalyptic Horizon of Environmental Reform, 8 INT'L
SOC. 431, 433, 439-56 (1993) (discussing Beck's "Risk Society" and the modernization of the environment
and environmental concerns).
209. BECK, supra note 196, at 183-84 (discussing the formation of politics in the West) (emphasis
deleted).
210. Id. at 185,195-99.
211. DRYZEK, ETAL.,supra note 23.
212. DRYZEK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 95-96; MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUNG: AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4-5 (1995); Frederick H. Buttel,
Globalization, Environmental Reform, and U.S. Hegemony, in GOVERNING ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS:
GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO SOCIAL THEORY 157, 157--84 (Gert Spaargaren, Arthur P. J. Mol & Frederick
H. Buttel eds. 2006).
213. DRYZEK, ET AL., supra note 23, at 96-99.
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But governance is the victim of the authoritarian law enforcement campaigns. Cadre
evaluation is a mechanism within the Party's or government's decision-making
process. It is neither subject to judicial review,21 ' nor open to the general public. In
the process, climate change policy is decided by a government agency that is more
interested in energy, and has thus framed the issue from that point of view. The goal
of energy conservation and efficiency was further narrowed down to specific targets
and numbers; in the campaigns, these numbers were further broken down into
quotas for each province, municipality, and SOE. Bureaucratic centralization
exerted complete control. In terms of substance, NDRC's climate policy was more
centered on capital and technology. But this does not mean that governance can be
ignored. Campaigns become a self-fulfilling prophecy; in response to environmental
crises, law enforcement campaigns are justified by their short-term "success." But
because real problems are not addressed, more crises follow, and more campaigns
are launched in response. The logic of law enforcement campaigns not only denies
its own failure, but also demands its return, again and again.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The new developmental strategy, developed in the Central Economic Work
Conference in December 2004, represented a dramatic shift in China's
conceptualization of climate change.2"5 Having recognized the challenges to China's
key strategic interests-security in energy supply, food production, and domestic
stability-China took a decisive step in improving energy efficiency and reducing
emissions. The primary policy maker, both in terms of design and implementation,
was the powerful NDRC, which is also in charge of the nation's energy policy.216 This
essay analyzes how the regulatory measures-closure campaigns-were chosen and
employed to meet the targets of energy efficiency and emission reductions. In doing
so, this essay aims to demonstrate, on a more general level, an internal logic of
China's crisis-driven governance: in a crisis situation, the policymaker needs a quick
and deliverable solution, which makes top-down closure campaigns the preferred
choice. Other regulatory instruments-a carbon tax, cap-and-trade, "Green GDP,"
and stronger public participation in the environment impact assessment process-are
discussed and considered favorably by the Ministry of Environment and other
regulatory agencies, and thus are potentially available options.
But these
21 7
alternatives are consistently turned down by NDRC.
The closure campaign in China can be considered a theatrical representation of
a mentality that is focused on Green as a goal while ignoring Green as a process.
But China is not unique. After all, Green as a process is a threat to vested interests
everywhere. In the United States, after the House of Representatives narrowly
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152 CHINA Q.832 (1997).
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passed the ACES Act in June 2009,28 interest groups representing coal and oil

attempted to sabotage the democratic process by faking their own identities.21 9 Nor
is Green as a process getting much attention in the international arena where climate
diplomacy is exclusively focused on targets and timetables. 20 This is especially true

as the Copenhagen Conference is approaching.221 Climate diplomacy, intensive as it
is, is all about deals and negotiations based on targets and timetables, while Green as

a process is often forgotten.
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